Contents

Preface 4
Purpose and Goals 4
Advisory Board 5
Forum Secretariat 5
2013 Programme 6
Opening Speeches 8
   H.E. Hailemariam Desalegn 8
   H.E. Olusegun Obasanjo 11
Discussion Panels 13
   Session I: Tribute to Meles Zenawi 13
   Sessions II and III: Security and Organized Crime in Africa 13
Closing Remarks 18
   H.E. Olusegun Obasanjo 18
Press Conferences 20
List of Participants 22
Acknowledgements 46
Annex I – Summary Note on Security and Organized Crime in Africa 48
Annex III – Keynote address by Thabo Mbeki 60
Annex IV - Tribute to Meles Zenawi by H.E. Paul Kagame 81
Annex V – Tribute to Meles by Prof. Andreas Eshete 85
Annex VI – Speech by Somali President Sheikh Mohamud 90
Annex VII – Speech by Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir 93
Annex VIII – Host City: Bahir Dar 96
Preface

This Report contains an overview of the speeches, remarks and main discussion topics from the 2nd Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa, held on 20 & 21 April, 2013 in Bahir Dar, Ethiopia. A summary note and a discussion paper on the selected theme, “Security and Organized Crime in Africa” are also included as annexes in this report.

The Forum sought to provide African key stakeholders with a platform to work towards effective African-led solutions to the continent’s most pressing security challenges. Current and former Heads of State and Government, distinguished leaders of regional and sub-regional bodies, representatives from the private sector, concerned civil society from Africa, eminent personalities from politics and media, representatives of African and non-African multi-lateral bodies, and other important partners attended the Forum.

The Forum was organized by the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) of Addis Ababa University. IPSS is a premier institute of higher education for peace and security studies in the region. Its mission is to promote peace and security in Ethiopia and Africa at large through education, research and professional development. The Institute produces skilled professionals in conflict prevention, management, and resolution, as well as in peace building, and promotes the values of a democratic and peaceful society.

Additional information about the Forum and resource materials can be obtained by visiting our website.

Purpose and Goals

The Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa complements recurrent formal meetings of African leaders in a collaborative manner. In the spirit of gatherings taking place under the Baobab, the Forum offers space for panel discussions, interaction with the floor, and bilateral talks to share views and experiences in a time efficient, results-oriented and open manner.

One of the main objectives of the Forum is to work towards effective African-led solutions to the continent’s most pressing security challenges through agenda-setting and the provision of a platform for discussion. It promotes strategic and pro-active management of African peace and security issues, driven by the interest to contribute to stronger ownership of and a larger constituency for African-led solutions.

The unique opportunity given to participants consists of the exchange of experiences and insights set against a background of minimal formalities and a pragmatic limitation to an inclusive dialogue in a spirit of problem-solving. African political decision-makers interact and consult with key African and global actors within a substantive open debate on peace and security issues of strategic importance to the continent, its regional institutions and African Union member states.
Advisory Board

H.E. Olusegun Obasanjo, former President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Forum Chairperson)
H.E. Thabo Mbeki, former President of the Republic of South Africa
H.E. Pierre Buyoya, former President of the Republic of Burundi
H.E. Betty Bigombe, State Minister of Water Resources, Uganda
Professor Ndioro Ndiaye, former Minister for Social Development and former Minister for Women’s, Children’s and Family Affairs, Senegal
Professor Mahmood Mamdani, Executive Director, Makerere Institute of Social Research, Uganda
Dr. Funmi Olonisakin, Director, African Leadership Centre/Conflict Security and Development Group
Ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun, Initiatives et Changement International
Professor Andreas Esheté, Special Advisor to the Prime Minister with the Rank of a Minister in Ethiopia (Forum CEO, ex officio member of the board).

Forum Secretariat

With a view to contributing to the implementation of the AU Tripoli Declaration of August 2009, the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) of Addis Ababa University has taken the initiative to convene, on an annual basis, the Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa. This initiative is a response to the Tripoli Declaration that appeals for “African-centred solutions”, and designates peace and security as a collective “intellectual challenge”. The Institute is the organizing Secretariat of the Forum.

Parallel to the Forum, IPSS runs the Africa Peace and Security Programme (APSP) jointly with the African Union. APSP aims to build the continent’s capacities to develop and implement African-led solutions in peace and security in Africa. The Forum, in this context, is used as a testing ground for outcomes of the Institute’s research, training and policy dialogues. It helps ideas on African centred solutions in peace and security within the Institute converge with the wider objective of informing decision-making and policy formulation and implementation at the AU, RECs/RMs levels.

"I want to appreciate the services and commend the Institute for Peace and Security Studies and the entire team of ninety four people composed of Ethiopians and African nations of the Tana Forum Secretariat...Within a year of the existence of the Forum, progress is obvious not only in the number of staff employed but also in the impact that is being made".

H.E. Olusegun Obasanjo, Forum Chairperson
# Programme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>08.00 – 12.00</td>
<td>Arrival of participants and registration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.00 – 14.00</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.00 – 14.10</td>
<td>OPENING SESSION:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chair: Prof. Andreas Eshete, Special Advisor to the Prime Minister of Ethiopia with the rank of a Minister and CEO, Tana High-Level Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.10 – 14.40</td>
<td>Introductory video: maiden Tana High-Level Forum highlights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.40 – 14.50</td>
<td>Welcome address: H.E. Hailemariam Desalegn, Prime Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.50 – 15.00</td>
<td>Introductory remarks: H.E. Olusegun Obasanjo, Former President of Nigeria and Chairperson of the Tana High-Level Forum Advisory Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.00 – 15.00</td>
<td>Remarks from H.E. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, President, Republic of Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.00 – 15.20</td>
<td>SESSION I: Tribute to the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chair: H.E. Olusegun Obasanjo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.20 – 15.30</td>
<td>A short film on the Late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.30 – 15.45</td>
<td>A brief portrait by Prof. Andreas Eshete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.45 – 16.15</td>
<td>Panel on Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s vision on the democratic developmental state and its promise for Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Panelists:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Dr. Jean Ping, Former Chairperson of the African Union, Gabon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Mr. Charles Abugre, Deputy Director for Africa, UN Millennium Campaign, Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.15 – 16.30</td>
<td>Break</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.40 – 17.00</td>
<td>SESSION II: Security and Organized Crime in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chair: Professor Ndioro Ndiaye, President, Alliance for Migration, Leadership and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.00 – 17.30</td>
<td>Panel on security and organized crime in Africa: A response to President Mbeki’s keynote address</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Panelists:

- Amb. Zachary Muburi-Muita, Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) to the African Union, United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU)
- Prof. Ibrahima Fall, Former Special Representative of the UN General Secretary for the Great Lakes Region and Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Senegal
- Prof. Alex de Waal, Director, World Peace Foundation, USA
- Prof. Mahmood Mamdani, Executive Director, Makerere Institute of Social Research, Uganda
- Mrs. Meron Estafanos, Journalist and General Secretary of the International Commission on Eritrean Refugees (ICER)

### Time Day Two: Sunday 21st April 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Day Two: Sunday 21st April 2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8.00 – 10.00</td>
<td>Networking meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SESSION III : Security and organized crime in Africa (Continued)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chair: H.E. Betty Bigombe, State Minister of Water and Environment, Uganda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.00 – 11.45</td>
<td>Panel on bilateral, regional and international cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panelists:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Mr. Youssouf Ouedraogo, Political Advisor to the President of the African Development Bank and Former Prime Minister of Burkina Faso</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Prof Amos C. Sawyer, Chairperson, African Peer Review Mechanism - Panel of Eminent Persons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Mr. El Gassim Wane, Director, Peace and Security Department, African Union Commission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Prof. Faraj Najem, Special Advisor to the Prime Minister of Libya on Africa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Dr. Greg Mills, Director, The Brenthurst Foundation, South Africa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Brig.-Gen. Elhadi Ali Messaoud Gibril, Executive Secretary, North African Regional Community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.45 – 12.45</td>
<td>Discussions with the floor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.45 – 13.00</td>
<td>Remarks to the press: H.E Olusegun Obasanjo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.00 – 14.30</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.30</td>
<td>Departure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Opening Remarks by H.E. Hailemariam Desalegn

Prime Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

Your Excellency Omar Hassan Al Bashir,
President of the Republic of Sudan,

Your Excellency Paul Kagame, President of the Republic of Rwanda,

Your Excellency Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud, President of the Federal Republic of Somalia

Your Excellency Olusegun Obasanjo, former President of the Federal Republic of South Africa

Distinguished Guests, Dear Participants, Ladies and Gentlemen

First and foremost, I would like to welcome you all on behalf the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and of myself to the second edition of the Tana High Level Forum on Security in Africa. I feel personally honoured and privileged to make this welcoming address to such a distinguished panel of leaders, world class intellectuals and African security stakeholders from all over Africa. The high level of attendance today is a clear indication that the Forum has indeed taken on a momentum of its own. I would like therefore to take this opportunity to thank the dedicated leadership of the Forum by President Obasanjo and President Mbeki, among others, for a job well done.

Excellencies,

Ladies and gentlemen,

As you all know, this was intended to serve as a forum that provides opportunities for African leaders and other stakeholders - private and public alike - to exchange experiences and insights of peace and security issues among themselves - and draw practical lessons that they will adapt to their respective environments. It is also expected that the forum will contribute a substantive, open and transparent African debate on issues of strategic importance to the continent and its regional and sub-regional institution. By fostering an inclusive dialogue and constructive engagement among African stakeholders in peace and security - both private, public as well as academic - it will also pave the way for generating African solutions to African problems. The format that the forum uses to conduct its deliberations is also intended
to engender the kind of openness and transparency required of such platforms.

Excellencies,

Ladies and gentlemen,

It is rather with a mixed feeling both of sadness and pride that we kick off the second edition of Tana Forum today. Sad, because we have, since the inaugural conference last April, lost our visionary leader and the Forum’s ardent champion and by far biggest advocate, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. This is indeed a big loss. But we are also proud in equal measure because many have honoured and continue to honour his name by maintaining and building on his legacy. It is therefore fitting that the 2nd Tana High Level Forum pay tribute to his legacy by among other things reflecting on his life-long commitment to the cause of realizing a democratic developmental state.

Excellencies,

Ladies and gentlemen,

The topic the Forum will take up over the weekend concerns security and organized crime in Africa. This is a very appropriate subject in more ways than one. As you all know, it has become conventional wisdom in western media and economic literature to describe Africa as the next growth pole. In light of the impressive growth rate that Africa has been registering the last decade or so, it is not entirely implausible to suggest that the 21st century is indeed Africa’s century. But there are so many daunting challenges ahead and none is more daunting than the challenge we face in the security sector. One of the many manifestations of this challenge is of course organized crime.

Organized crime in a broader sense includes, but is not limited to, transnational, national or local groups functioning within a structure and engaging in politically or economically motivated unlawful activity. It is widely recognized that Africa faces challenges on account of increasing transnational organized crime, which in many ways also causes threats to governance and security. Among the wide variety of criminal activities affecting Africa the following stand out: the production, trafficking and sale of illegal drugs; the smuggling of illegal immigrants to Europe and the Middle East; people trafficking including abduction and sexual slavery; organ harvesting; the illegal extraction and sale of precious metals under the cover of bloody conflicts; and of course piracy. These problems stem from deep political and economic structural problems; but they are not necessarily caused by political crises.

There is no doubt there is a need to respond to this serious and growing problem. In addition to this there is an equally important need to review existing policies, if any, to tackle the problem. It is, therefore, my hope and expectation that this Forum will deal at length on issues such as the root causes of transnational criminal activities in Africa; and lay bare the underlying causes of this scourge. It is also important that the Forum discuss how Africa should respond to the crisis taking into consideration the
African traditional value systems and the structural political and economic reforms required to effectively addressing this challenge.

Excellencies,

Ladies and gentlemen,

The rampant piracy that we see in the Gulf of Guinea and Gulf of Aden as well as the illegal trafficking of hundreds of thousands of youth to the Middle East and Europe are a stark reminder that organized crime has indeed taken on an enormous life of its own, threatening to cancel out whatever gains Africa made as a result of the economic growth of the last decade or so.

It is my hope and expectation that our deliberations will be both candid and productive. On a lighter note, it is appropriate at this point to remind you once again to heed President Obasanjo’s unwritten rule that he wanted to make a tradition of the forum about the dress code we should observe throughout our deliberations. Let’s all be attired in a decently informal way.

Wishing you productive exchange of ideas,

I thank you.
Welcome Address by H.E. Olusegun Obasanjo

Chairperson, Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa

Excellences, Honorable Ministers,Ambassadors, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, welcome to the Second Tana High Level Forum on Security in Africa.

We are gathered here again, under the Baobab tree which symbolizes the Tana Forum, and our traditions, cultures and values, to discuss about the critical issues and challenges that confront our continent.

We are also here today to pay tribute to one of the greatest champions of the Tana Forum and a visionary son of Africa, the late Prime Minister of Ethiopia, H.E. Meles Zenawi. His dedication and determination to see not only Ethiopia but Africa out of the plight of destitution, poverty, conflict and insecurity has been exemplary to all of us who worked with him closely and an inspiration to many within and beyond our continent. I ask that we observe a minute of silence in his memory.

Excellences, Honorable Ministers, Ambassadors, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, we were here last year reminding ourselves of the pressing challenges the continent faced. Since we met last, the challenges faced by our continent have not diminished. These include the Arab Spring in North Africa which culminated in difficult times for Tunisia, Egypt and Libya; the border disputes between Sudan and South Sudan and the recent situations in Mali and Central Africa Republic.

However we have cause to celebrate: the success of the African Union Peacekeeping Mission in Somalia, through its regional peacekeeping mission, AMISOM; peaceful elections in Kenya and continuous economic growth in many African nations.

But we should remind ourselves that much work needs to be done, particularly in light of a disturbing trend in our continent with regards to organized crime. Organized crime is a growing phenomenon of the 21st Century adding to the security challenges of Africa, and particularly challenges faced by fragile states.

Organized crime in Africa takes many
national and transnational shapes and forms. These include, but are not limited to, the trafficking of narcotic drugs and arms trafficking, trafficking of people and human organs, precious minerals and resources, piracy, money-laundering and trade in counterfeit products ranging from cigarettes to fake medicines.

Beyond the devastating human tragedy trans-national organized crime inflicts, it has the potential to destroy our social fabric, destabilize states and foster insecurity in our continent. The increasingly sophisticated web of criminal networks linking several states necessitate our collective energy, resources and commitment in order to combat the criminals.

This is also an opportunity for us to learn from the experiences of others who are affected by organized crime while highlighting bilateral, regional and international cooperation uniquely positioned to provide African-led solutions.

The theme of this year’s Forum, therefore, could not have been more relevant and urgent. We will once again open the debate on what sustains and perpetuates such illicit activities, as well as interrogate our current responses to these threats towards identifying African-led approaches to this critical challenge facing our continent.

The forum has now become an institution and its board will continue to work tirelessly towards the attainment of sustained peace in Africa hand in hand with our many partners including the African Union Commission. Lastly, on behalf of the Tana Forum Board, I would like to thank the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, and particularly, H.E. Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn and his government, for recognizing the importance of this Forum and ensuring its continuity.

I will also want to appreciate the services and commend the Director of the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS), Mr. Mulugeta Gebrehiwot Berhe and the entire team of ninety four people composed of Ethiopians and African nationals of the Tana Forum secretariat led by Mrs. Michelle Ndiaye Ntab. Within a year of the existence of the Forum, progress is obvious not only in the number of staff employed but also in the impact that is being made.

To our sponsors and financial supporters within and outside Africa beginning with Sheikh Al Amoudi from Ethiopia, the African Union Commission (AUC), Ethiopian Airlines, the Governments of Germany and of the Kingdom of Norway, we say once again thank you for your generous contributions.

Thank you for listening.
Discussion Summary

Session I: Tribute to Meles Zenawi
His Excellency Meles Zenawi was remembered by his peers and contemporaries who described him as an intellectual, visionary, statesman and patriot. He measured a leader’s legitimacy in power by their country’s real progress and development, and committed himself to the prosperity of the continent.

Prime Minister Meles’ contribution encompasses the whole continent of Africa, championing its cause at various international fora. A man of strong conviction, his strength derived from his ability to subject issues to thorough study and analysis, from which one could chart a path to development based on home-grown solutions. He was somebody who liked to read and critique what he read, believing that one should be well informed in order to engage intellectually.

H.E. Meles radically redefined Ethiopia’s political community and its cultural identity, and institutionalized these in the new constitution. He declared war on poverty and promoted the democratic developmental state as the institutional and strategic vehicle for Ethiopia’s economic and social transformation. His Excellency viewed democracy as a process, not as a state, holding fast that Africans can only build the basis of long-term peace when the the relationship between development and democracy is well understood.

He further posited that the sustainability of peace rests on shared prosperity, cultures, and effective participation in shaping the economy and politics of a country. He was certain that the full freedom and equality of all cultural communities were essential to healing the rifts that threatened to tear Ethiopia apart. His key to Ethiopia’s development rested on a diverse and inclusive society and the solidarity of its people.

Sessions II and III: Security and Organized Crime in Africa
The theme of “Security and Organized Crime in Africa” was timely and critical in light of the Arab Uprising in North Africa, the situation in Mali, and other hot flash points in parts of Africa. The underlining concern during instability and conflict on the continent is the space they create for organized crimes, including but not limited to, human trafficking, trade of illegal drugs, weapons’ sales, sexual slavery, organ harvesting, piracy, and illegal natural resource mining. Organized crime is one of Africa’s biggest roadblocks to development. While stemming in large part from deep economic and political structural problems, these are not the exclusive causes of organized crime in Africa.

The complexity of factors influencing peace and security in Africa is evidenced by the case of Libya in the post-Gaddafi era, where post-revolution crime thrives as a result of power vacuums. Arguably, the biggest threat is posed by the prevalence of incongruent groups claiming autonomy and authority. The situation has had important ramifications for the entire Sahel region, with uncontrolled outage of weapons pouring into neighbouring countries Mali and Tunisia, and
further to Jordan, Gaza, and Syria.

In Sudan as well, the nexus between internal armed conflicts and organized crime is visible. The conflict in Darfur erupted because of scarce resources, but is exacerbated by arms dealers and other organized criminal activities. Efforts are being made to fight this, including through international agreements demonstrating Sudan’s willingness for peace, collaboration with neighbouring states, and restoring regional peace. Young people are receiving vocational training to prevent them from being recruits by criminals, while law enforcement institutions are receiving support and capacity building. The implementation of legal instruments and regulations will also serve to deter and monitor money laundering and other criminal activities.

Still, intra-state violence remains a threat to security on the continent. Such violence emanates from factors such as the scramble for political power (as in the CAR) and election-related violence (as in Kenya) or competition over resources (as in Sudan) among others. Ethnic-based political struggle creates a space for organized crime to flourish through corruption and bribery. In turn, intra-state violence becomes a conduit for various forms of trafficking.

Organized crime in the case of Somalia appears to be linked with terrorism, particularly with the activities of Al-Shabaab. Ransom money paid in millions of dollars to Somali pirates has the potential to make its way to terrorist organizations; as such, piracy does not only impact Somalia’s security and economy but also the broader international community. To this end, the Government of Somalia has engaged in mediation efforts with pirates to encourage them to denounce the practice and rejoin the broader law abiding citizenry. Vocational training centres are being established to provide former pirates the necessary skills to contribute to society productively.

The situation of human trafficking is part of a crime value chain, with perpetrators in the origin, transit, and destination states. A number of factors contribute to Africans emigrating from their countries of origin, among which are the pursuit of economic opportunities, fleeing from violence or political instability, and avoiding legal persecution. Along their journeys, they face many dangers, including that of being kidnapped and being held for ransom. In the Sinai in Egypt for example, there are approximately 1,000 Eritrean, Sudanese, and Ethiopian refugees being held hostage and tortured, with their captors demanding up to 40,000 USD each for their release. Many suffer long-term psychological and physical trauma as a result of their time in torture camps.

Additionally, a burgeoning youth population, constituting the largest section of African people, and lacking adequate employment, increases the propensity towards organized crime. Moreover, psycho-social factors such as the need to belong, a breakdown of traditional social values, and a dearth of positive mentorship drive youth towards gang activities. Youth become both victims of and actors in organized crime in Africa.

Drug trafficking presents a peculiar prob-
lem for Africa. On a large scale, drugs are neither produced nor consumed on the continent, but the trade of prohibited substances is becoming a growing threat. In Guinea Bissau the drug trade escalated to a degree to which it had an impact on the country’s politics, resulting in a coup d’état. Africa is sandwiched between the Western countries that drive the drug trade as consumers and financiers, and Latin American states that are the biggest producers and merchants.

Organized crime is a vicious cycle and a great set back to states. Higher incidences of organized crime are witnessed in the 25 so-called failed states of Africa, characterized by collapsed institutions such as the police and judiciary. Absence of governance creates an environment amenable also to trans-boundary criminal activity. Furthermore, despite expectations for enhanced democratic space, one sees increased manifestations of façade democracies that are expansive on democratic rhetoric but autocratic in practice.

Fighting organized crime is a difficult undertaking, compounded by the fact that some authoritative political figures are themselves involved in illicit activities. In some cases, political campaigns in Africa are funded by criminal syndicates. Mali is one example, where organized criminals finance political organizations in Bamako, making it difficult to eradicate criminal activity. When it comes to drug trafficking in fact, and contrary to some assertions, drug traders do not favour instability or insecurity; rather they prefer stable governments that they could work with through bribes.

Although human trafficking is an African crime against Africans, the continent is wanting in terms of a common development narrative focussing on African nation-building. States where tribal, ethnic or religious loyalties take precedence over national loyalty experience frequent political struggles as power assures favoritism and creates space for organized crime to flourish through corruption and bribery. The absence of a common political citizenship polarizes even seemingly democratic elections because of tribal and ethnic loyalties of the parties and the understanding that the winner will serve the interests of his or her constituents rather than all citizens.

There already exists a corpus of policies crafted to tackle security concerns, but these are not being implemented, a fact attributable in large part to leadership failure. Associated with this is the need to interrogate the definition of leadership - in order to address organized crime, Africa needs committed leaders. Strengthening police structures and legal systems can ameliorate organized crime, but all methodologies must take note of increasing links between globalization and organized crime.

There is widespread agreement that holistic measures pertaining to every segment of society, and incorporating national, regional, and continental efforts are required to fight organized crime in Africa. The basis of this is the principle of common and shared responsibility by all African citizens and leaders. Building the capacity of each African state to tackle and contain its problems is essential in order to pave the way for development. Economic reforms are an imperative for
African governments to create opportunities for their people and prevent illegal migration and involvement in organized crime.

Diversity of African states should be managed and ethnic groups fairly represented politically rather than assigning power along clan lines. Issues of religious intolerance also create a fertile atmosphere for underdevelopment and violence. A common political citizenship should be developed in all African states, emphasizing loyalty to a democratic and prosperous state above ethnic and religious allegiances. Common political citizenship is defined as building a nation based on shared values and principles and strengthening of political and economic institutions to work for all citizens.

The state as a pillar of development is instrumental in the effort to eradicate organized crime in Africa through robust institutions. Eradication of organized crime will also depend on how external factors are managed. Where donor assistance is needed, local players must be encouraged to participate in solutions to problems, as success is ultimately down to the local leadership. Africa must strive to provide for its people, ensure human security and reflect true democracy for the benefit of its citizens.

Establishing an effective security sector to usher in stability and curb organized crime remains a priority for many African states. When it comes to drug trafficking, it is important for Africa to identify the problem for itself, based on its interests and realities. Africa should not simply accept the illegality of drugs as outlined by European or American lobbyists, but rather decide independently what should be criminalized and how best to combat it. With regard to addressing human trafficking, the sustainable solution would be through the stability of African states which currently produce refugees. In the meantime, international organizations must provide support to transit and destination states to handle the influx of illegal immigrants and ensure that they receive proper protection.

Africa now needs young innovative leadership, led by the experienced elderly. It requires responsive educational systems to adjust to its changing needs and circumstances. An integral part of the fight against organized crime is thus intergenerational exchange to enable the youth to articulate their needs and learn from previous generations. As the future of Africa is in the hands of those aged between 18 and 35, they have a huge stake in a crime-free, stable continent and must be part of the solution. Government policies should create economic opportunities for youth, foster youth political representation, and include youth in addressing relevant challenges. Multi-pronged strategies must be deployed to deter youth from organized crime, reflecting genuine engagement, political freedom, and positive leadership.

In reinforcing the concept of African solutions to African problems, the AU should take a lead in instituting effective measures to counter security threats. Nevertheless the importance of international cooperation should not be overlooked in the fight against organized crime in Africa. It is important that
African states make good use of regional bodies such as ECOWAS or SADC to strengthen regional relationships. The African Development Bank has been working to stimulate growth through the RECS, a strategy which is perceived to reduce opportunities for organized crime. Cooperation between multilateral organization such as the African Union and the United Nations is indispensable. States need to cooperate to disrupt financial flows of proceeds from drug trafficking operations and related crimes such as human trafficking and money laundering. This international cooperation can also be enhanced through exchange of best practices on a wide range of interventions to deal with organized crime in Africa.

It is not poverty, but rather inequality, political malfeasance, avarice, and perceived injustices that are the major causes of violence in most countries of Africa. The ills of negative perceptions such as these can be eliminated through a new culture that avoids countries of eternal leaders. Africa must instead cultivate reform and inclusiveness to increase state integrity. At the heart of Africa’s response strategies to combating organized crime, however, must be included the African traditional value systems.
Closing Remarks by H.E. Olusegun Obasanjo

Chairperson, Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa

Ladies and gentlemen, on this occasion we have taken two themes, if you like. We have paid tribute to the initiator, the visionary leader who established this Forum, the Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. Yesterday we heard a lot about what he did and what he left behind. We talk self-reliance, building infrastructure, and democratic development; we may even ask which one comes first – is it democracy or development? But I believe that what we came up with yesterday is that they must go hand in hand. Meles Zenawi got that right.

Then we talked about the security situation on our continent. We have a bit of a leadership deficit in Africa today, otherwise some of the points we discussed would not have arisen. I do not believe, for instance, that we were too weak to move into Mali when what the Malian leaders called “mutiny” – the coup – happened. Therefore, we invite incumbent leaders to come here and interact to confront the challenges of the continent.

The causes and effects of organized crime were also discussed. Whether you talk of poverty, unemployment, or any other theme, there is one topic in my mind which you cannot rule out as a cause of drug trafficking and organized crime. To me, this is real or perceived injustice to which people react strongly, particularly the youth. We can speak of an inclusive government or an exclusive one; corruption and other problems in society, but they are all manifestations of the same theme: injustice, either real or perceived.

When Meron Estefanos spoke yesterday about the plight of Eritrean refugees, I was shocked almost to the point of shedding tears, that human beings – Africans – were being treated that way. Here is a problem staring us in the face. We shouldn’t have our trousers burning while we are dancing a slow fox trot. We have several heads of state here, and representatives from the African Union Commission. There is no excuse for us to linger on this issue. I want to challenge all of us to act, so that next year, Madam Estefanos can come and tell us what improvements have been made.

I want to thank our youth for your presentations. One thing is clear, and that is
that we called you to hear your point of view and to engage with you. You are not just leaders of tomorrow – you are to prepare yourselves and take up the leadership role now. Learn from the leaders of the past and the leaders of today. If all you learn is the way not to do things, you have still learned something.

We should criticize ourselves objectively, but we should also identify where we are making progress. It is not all doom and gloom; we are making progress in some areas, so let us pat ourselves on the back. But where we are not doing well enough, let us be courageous enough to say that we should do better.

Let me now come to the issue of drugs. I believe that the essence of what Alex de Waal was saying is that, with drugs as with any economic issue, there will be demand and supply, but Africa neither supplies nor demands them. If we can deal with the source of demand, and if we can deal with the source of supply, maybe there will be no trade and our continent will not become a transit post. Why should those who have the demand or must take care of the demand pass the problem to us?

I believe we have had two days of a very engaging and instructive Forum. This is our second one and we hope to continue to improve by practice. I want to thank all our leaders who have honoured us with their presence: President Al Bashir, President Kagame, President Mohamoud, and of course, the host, Prime Minister Hailemariam. I also want to thank all the panellists for all that you have done to make this a very successful forum. I want to once again thank our supporters who backed us through resources; we are immensely grateful to you all. Finally, I particularly want to thank the management and staff of this venue.

I must ask now the Members of the Advisory Board to accompany me to the Press Conference and assist me in answering questions from the media.

Thank you all very much.

Au revoir, and see you next year.
Press Conferences

A press conference was held on the Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa on 19 April 2013, at the Sheraton Addis Hotel. The press conference, hosted by Forum Chairperson H.E. Olusegun Obasanjo, Forum CEO Professor Andreas Esheté, and Forum Coordinator Mrs. Michelle Ndiaye Ntab, was attended by over 30 members from the international and local media.

Speaking at the conference, H.E. Obasanjo highlighted one of the challenges in security and organized crime: “Organized crime knows no border, it is transnational. Because of this, we need all hands on deck...we must adopt both carrot and stick in fighting organized crime”.

Following the conclusion of the Forum, a second press conference was held on the afternoon of 21 April 2013 in Bahir Dar. This provided an opportunity for all media representatives who attended the Forum to interact with the Forum’s Advisory Board and to ask questions about the issues discussed during the two-day event.
Participants

Dr. Abdalla Hamdok  
Deputy Executive Secretary  
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)

Amb. Abdel Raman Sir Elkhatim  
Ambassador  
Embassy of the Republic of Sudan to Ethiopia

Amb. Abdelwahab Elsawi  
Head of Political Affairs Department  
Office of the President, Republic of Sudan

Mr. Abdul Mohamed  
Consultant  
High Level Panel for Sudan

Dr. Abyé Tasse  
Advisor to the Minister d’Etat for NEHES  
Ministère d’Etat à l’Education Nationale, Mauritania
REPORT ON THE 2ND
TANA HIGH-LEVEL FORUM
ON SECURITY IN AFRICA

Prof. Admasu Tsegaye
President,
Addis Ababa University

Dr. Alex de Waal
Director
World Peace Foundation

Mr. Alexander Rondos
EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa
European External Action Service (EEAS)

Dr. Alhaji Sarjoh Bah
AU Liaison Officer to SADC

Mr. Alula Iyasu
Research Coordinator
Institute for Peace and Security Studies
Prof. Amos C. Sawyer
Chairman
Governance Commission of Liberia

Mrs. Andrea Böhm
Foreign Policy Desk Editor
Die Zeit / German Weekly

Professor Andreas Esheté
Special Advisor to the Prime Minister with the Rank of a Minister in Ethiopia
CEO, Tana High-Level Forum

Mr. Awel Uwihanganye
CEO
LéO Africa Forum

Mr. Ayalew Gobeze
President
Amhara Regional State
Amb. Bassirou Sene
Ambassador
Embassy of Senegal to Ethiopia

Mr. Baylie Damtie
President
Bahir Dar University

Mr. Belkacem Sahli
State Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
Algeria

H.E. Bethel Nnaemeka Amadi
President
Pan African Parliament

H.E. Betty Bigombe
State Minister of Water Resources, Uganda
Advisory Board Member, Tana High-Level Forum
Amb. Christopher Chika
Deputy Head of Mission
Embassy of Kenya to Ethiopia

Mr. Claude Alain Djally
ADC to H.E. Jean Ping

Dr. Dagmawi Woubshet
Assistant Professor
Cornell University

Dr. Dawit Zewdie
Director
Africa Humanitarian Action (AHA)

Amb. Dina Mufti
Spokesperson, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ethiopia
REPORT ON THE 2ND TANA HIGH-LEVEL FORUM ON SECURITY IN AFRICA

Brig.-Gen. Elhadi Ali Messaoud Gibril  
Executive Secretary  
North Africa Regional Capability (NARC)

Amb. Elsayed Elreedy  
Honorary Chairman  
Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs

Mr. Fasil Amdetsion  
Senior Policy and International Legal Adviser  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ethiopia

Ms. Fawzia Yusuf H. Adam  
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Federal Government of Somalia

Dr. Frannie Humplick Léautier  
Executive Secretary  
African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF)
Dr. Funmi Olonisakin
Director, African Leadership Centre/Conflict Security and Development Group
Advisory Board Member, Tana High-Level Forum

H.E. Gary Quince
Head of Delegation
European Union Delegation to the African Union

Col. Gebregziabher Alemseged
Somalia Peace Facilitation Unit
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

Mr. Gerhard Mai
Sector Manager, Peace and Security, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH

Mr. Getachew Reda
Press and Publicity State Minister
Office of the Prime Minister, Ethiopia
Mr. Giorgio Romano  
Rule of Law Advisor  
European Union Delegation to African Union

H.E. Mr. Greg Dorey  
Ambassador  
Embassy of the United Kingdom to Ethiopia

Dr. Greg Mills  
Director  
Brenthurst Foundation, South Africa

H.E. Mr. Hailemariam Desalegn  
Prime Minister  
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

H.E. Mr. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud  
President  
Republic of Somalia
Ms. Helen Yosef
Outreach Coordinator / Deputy Forum Coordinator
Institute for Peace and Security Studies

Dr. Henry Boimah Fahnbulleh
National Security Advisor
Republic of Liberia

Dr. Hesphina Rukato
Deputy Chief of Staff
African Union Commission

Mr. Ibrahim Al-bakri Nyei
Policy Analyst
Governance Commission of Liberia

Prof. Ibrahima Fall
Independent Consultant and Political Scientist
Dakar, Senegal
H.E. Ms. Isabel Cristina de Azevedo Heyvaert  
Ambassador  
Embassy of Brazil to Ethiopia

Mr. Jalal Abdel-Latif  
Chief of Section, Civil Society and Post Conflict Governance and Public Administration Division  
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)

Dr. Jean-Bosco Mushi Butera  
Director, Africa Programme  
University for Peace

Mr. Jean Ping  
Former Chairperson of the African Union Commission

Mr. Joachim Spatz  
Chairman of the German Bundestag
H.E. Prof. Joseph Nsengimana
Ambassador
Embassy of Rwanda to Ethiopia

Mr. Kefale Ayalew
Amhara Regional Administration
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

General (ret.) Kersten Lahl
Director
Federal College for Security Studies (BAKS), Germany

Mr. Kevin Osido
MP Youth Parliament, Kenya

Dr. Kojo Busia
Chief, APRM Unit
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)
REPORT ON THE 2ND TANA HIGH-LEVEL FORUM ON SECURITY IN AFRICA

H.E. Mrs. Lieselore Cyrus
Ambassador
Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany to Ethiopia

Mr. Leonard M. Onyonyi
Peace and Security Expert
East African Community (EAC) Secretariat

H.E. Ms. Lisa Filipetto
Ambassador
Embassy of Australia to Ethiopia

Mr. Liu Naiya
First Secretary
Embassy of P. R. China to Ethiopia

Professor Mahmood Mamdani
Executive Director, Makerere Institute of Social Research, Uganda
Advisory Board Member, Tana High-Level Forum
Amb. Marc Koubèterzié Somda
Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération (MAECR)
Burkina Faso

Mr. Markus Koerner
Director, Africa Peace and Security Programme
Institute for Peace and Security Studies

Dr. Mary Chinery-Hesse
Member of the African Union Panel of the Wise

Mr. Meheretab Mulugeta
Director General, Protocol Affairs,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ethiopia

Ms. Mekdes Mezgebu
Programme Officer, United Nations Development Programme
Mr. Mema Alassane Blondin Beye
Board Member, Regional Integration Champion Af 2.0

Mrs. Meron Estefanos
Journalist and General Secretary of ICER
International Commission on Eritrean Refugees (ICER)

Mr. Mezni Noureddine
Advisor to H.E. Jean Ping

H.E. Michael A. Battle
Ambassador
United States Mission to the African Union (USAU)

Mrs. Michelle Ndiaye-Ntab
Senior Regional Advisor / Forum Coordinator
Institute for Peace and Security Studies
H.E. Mr. Mohamed Fathi Edrees
Ambassador
Embassy of Egypt to Ethiopia

H.E. Mr. Mohamed Idriss Farah
Ambassador
Embassy of Somalia to Ethiopia

Mr. Mohamed Behi Yonis
Deputy Joint Special Representative
UNAMID

Mr. Mulugeta Gebrehiwot
Director
Institute for Peace and Security Studies

Professor Ndioro Ndiaye
President, Alliance for Migration, Leadership and Development (AMLD)
Advisory Board Member, Tana High-Level Forum
H.E. Odd-Inge Kvalheim
Ambassador
Royal Norwegian Embassy to Ethiopia

Dr. Olakounle Gilles Yabi
West Africa Director
International Crisis Group

H.E. Olusegun Obasanjo
Former President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria
Chairperson, Tana High-Level Forum

H.E. Mr. Omar al-Bashir
President, Republic of Sudan

H.E. Mr. Paul Kagame
President
Republic of Rwanda
Amb. Peter G. Robleh
Chairman HESPI
HESPI Research & Training Institute

Dr. Rahel Kassahun
Founder and Executive Director
Africa Unbound Inc.

H.E. Mr. Renzo Marlo Rosso
Ambassador
Embassy of Italy to Ethiopia

Dr. Amb. Richard Sezibera
Secretary General
East African Community (EAC)

Ms. Sahlework Zewde
Director-General
United Nations Office at Nairobi (UNON)
Mr. Sebhat Negga
Executive Director
Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development (EI-IPD)

Prof. Shibru Desta
Executive Director
Ethiopian Academy of Sciences (EAS)

Amb. Siddig M. Abdallah
Director, International Law and Treaties Department
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sudan

Mr. Simachew Wondimagegn
Mayor
Bahir Dar City

Dr. Simon Akindes
Education Lead
Institute for Peace and Security Studies
Mr. Tamrat Kebede
Executive Director
InterAfrica Group

H.E. Thabo Mbeki
Former President of the Republic of South Africa
Advisory Board Member, Tana High-Level Forum

Dr. Tim Murithi
Head of Programme
Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR)

Mr. Tsegaye Berhe
National Security Advisor, with the Rank of Minister
Ethiopia

H.E. Mr. U. Kenan Ipek
Ambassador
Embassy of the Republic of Turkey to Ethiopia
Mr. Umberto Tavolato
Political Adviser to the EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa
European External Action Service (EEAS)

Mr. Vasu Gounden
Founder and Executive Director
African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)

H.E. Mr. William Anguille
Ambassador
Embassy of Gabon to Ethiopia

Mr. William Wallis
African Affairs Specialist
Financial Times

Mr. Wodajo Mogues
LCSW / Independent Consultant
Mr. Wondemu Asamene
Director General for African Affairs
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ethiopia

H.E. Mr. Xiaoyan Xie
Ambassador
Embassy of P.R. China to Ethiopia

Mr. Yibeltal Aemero
Assistant to the State Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ethiopia

H.E. Youssouf Ouedraogo
Special Advisor to the President
Africa Development Bank (AfDB)

Mr. Zachary Muburi-Muita
Special Representative to the Secretary General
United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU)

Prof. Zodwa Motsa
Country Director
University of South Africa (UNISA) Ethiopia Regional Centre
Acknowledgements

The Institute for Peace and Security Studies of Addis Ababa University serves as the Forum’s Secretariat. The Secretariat would like to express its sincere gratitude to those who contributed to making the Forum a success.

The Secretariat particularly extends its special thanks to the Board of Advisors for their invaluable leadership. These include Forum Chairperson H.E. Olusegun Obasanjo, and members, H.E. Thabo Mbeki, H.E. Pierre Buyoya, H.E. Betty Bigombe, Professor Ndiaye Ndioro, Professor Mahmood Mamdani, Ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun, as well as Forum CEO Professor Andreas Esheté.

We sincerely appreciate the diverse contributions and support from the following offices, institutions and organizations:
• The Ethiopian Government:
  ▪ Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  ▪ National Intelligence and Security Service
  ▪ The Federal Police
  ▪ Addis Ababa Traffic Police
  ▪ The Amhara Regional Government

• German Federal Foreign Office/ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH

• The Kingdom of Norway / Embassy of Norway to Ethiopia

• African Union Commission

• Ethiopian Airlines

• Avanti Blue Nile Hotel

• Kuriftu Resort & Spa

• Bahir Dar City Administration

In addition, our heartfelt gratitude goes to the staff at IPSS for their selfless and dedicated service.

As we eagerly look forward to the third edition of the Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa, we count on your continued support and cooperation in the years to come.

Sincerely,

Mulugeta Gebrehiwot
Director, Institute for Peace and Security Studies
Annex I

Security and Transnational Organized Crime

Summary note
It is widely recognized that Africa faces threats to governance and security from the increasing operations of transnational organized criminal networks. This briefing note seeks, first, to identify the dimensions of the problem; second, to indicate their significance at this time; and third, to define some key questions for discussion at the Forum, in order to enable participants to identify African-led approaches to these issues.

Transnational Organized Crime: The Nature of the Problem
Transnational organized criminal activities are a threat to African governance and security. They include:

- Production, trafficking and sale of illegal narcotic drugs;
- The smuggling of unlawful migrants into Europe;
- People trafficking, including abduction, enslavement and organ trafficking;
- “Conflict minerals” such as diamonds, gold and coltan extracted and sold illegally by insurgents;
- Maritime piracy;
- Unlawful trade in weapons;
- Trade in counterfeit products such as cigarettes;
- Money-laundering and financial extortion and deception.

These activities fuel corruption and in some cases contribute to violence. However, we should be aware that there is no automatic link between organized crime and political violence. While the profits from drug production have funded insurgencies in countries such as Colombia and Afghanistan, international drugs traders do not, in general, support rebel groups—they prefer to bribe government officials.

These activities stem from deeper structural political and economic problems. For example, the drugs trade exists because there is demand for these products in rich countries; people smuggling arises because of economic inequalities between rich and poor countries; piracy in the Indian Ocean derives from the impoverishment of Somali fishing communities and the lack of government institutions in that country; and the mining and sale of artisanal minerals by rebels in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo is a symptom of the unresolved conflict in that country, not the cause of it.

International policy responses, such as the U.S.-led “war on drugs”, also pose problems for Africa. For example, the experience of Mexico indicates that a militarized crackdown on drug cartels can fuel armed turf battles between lower-level drug smugglers, and violence between them and the law enforcement. Harsh measures against the brokers who organize unlicensed migration into Europe and push these people into the...
more harmful practices of people trafficking, including ransoming and organ trafficking. Many Congolese assert that the U.S. Dodd–Frank Act of July 2010 (Section 1502), which imposes a strict certification regime on international companies dealing in artisanal minerals from Congo and neighbouring countries, has deepened Congo’s crisis and not helped resolve it.

Why the Issue is Significant Today
The crisis in Mali and the Sahara, the allegation that Guinea Bissau is becoming a “narco-state,” the scandal of people trafficking in north-east Africa, piracy in the Indian Ocean, and the “conflict minerals” campaign in the U.S. have all focused attention on transnational organized crime.

Africa needs to respond to this serious and growing problem. Africa also needs to assess whether the standard policy responses prescribed by Europe and the U.S. — as outlined above — are in the continent’s interests or not. There are good reasons to worry that Africa has as much to fear from the “war on drugs” as from drugs themselves, or from the “conflict minerals” campaign as from these minerals themselves.

Critical Issues for Discussion
• What are the root causes of transnational criminal activities in Africa?
  ▪ How should Africa respond to issues of global economic inequality and the demand for drugs, counterfeit goods, cheap labour, and human organs in richer countries?
  ▪ How can African states strengthen their governance so as to minimize corruption arising from organized crime?
• Which current policies and practices against organized crime are working, and which are not?
  ▪ Which governments and international institutions are promoting policies based exclusively on prohibition, interdiction and policing, and why?
  ▪ What alternative policies — such as the legalization and regulation of the drugs trade, or voluntary codes of conduct for transparency in minerals extraction — are being advocated, by whom, and to what effect?
• What damage mitigation efforts — interdiction and law enforcement — are essential?
  ▪ What activities are criminal under any definition and should be the priorities for Africa’s law enforcement efforts?
  ▪ What European and American policies in this field are detrimental to Africa’s interests?
• How can African nations develop and implement policies that serve the continent’s core interests?
Annex II

Security and Organized Crime in Africa: Scope, Lessons and Strategies for Combating

Introduction

Trans-national organized crime is one of the major threats to governance in Africa with implications for peace and security. Drugs and human trafficking, illegal arms trade, piracy, forgery, mineral looting and the likes in parts of Africa have destabilized states and undermined many governments. The 2011 World Development Report suggested that the annual revenues accruing to organized criminal networks may be as high as $330 billion, with some estimates suggesting the shadow economy could be in the range of 10 percent of global GDP.\(^1\) Half of all illicit money in the world is estimated to come from developing and transition countries, representing a disproportionate fraction of these countries’ economies.\(^2\) And most of the transition countries for organized crime are increasingly within Africa.\(^3\)

TOC, however, while recognized as a threat, has not galvanized the sort of sustained commitment by African states as has the effort to combat terrorism and extremism. This almost singular focus on terrorism and extremism, while important, has shifted much needed resources and attention away from combating TOC, at best, and squeezed prescriptions for combating TOC into the terrorism and extremism prism, at worst. Where there are initiatives to combat TOC, the dominant approach is usually a “law-and-order” approach which may not be suited to African circumstances. Lack of a comprehensive and collaborative approach between states involved in the many and diverse aspects of TOC also undermines individual states’ efforts as criminal networks adapt, morph and shift their networks in line with one state’s actions and exploit neighboring states with weaker institutions.\(^4\)

Organized crime increasingly exploits the opportunities afforded by globalization. Financial deregulation, the growth in trade and travel, and the relative ease of movements of goods and services between states has benefited TOC as well as licit businessmen. As TOC becomes more lucrative, its networks are expanding to more conflict-affected and fragile states with highly structured and sophisticated networks linking Africa with Latin America, Asia to Europe and beyond. On one or two occasions, TOC has even been impli-

---

cated in financing terrorist and extremist
groups.\textsuperscript{5}

In absolute terms, the scale of TOC is
greatest in the richest countries, but its
share of total economic activity there
is relatively small so that it rarely be-
comes a substantial threat to state
security.\textsuperscript{6} Further, strong governance and
institutions allow for sustained fight
against TOC. But when the capacities of
criminal networks are deployed in coun-
tries with much smaller economies, or in
countries where economies and institu-
tions have been shattered by protracted
conflict, organized crime may possess
sufficient resources to overwhelm local
law enforcement and destabilize govern-
ments. The income TOC generates for its
clients and collaborators dwarfs income
generated through legal means, some-
times even dominating local economies.
This allows criminal networks to infil-
trate or patronize even the highest levels
of government, the military and police.
Such vast sums of money not only enrich
individuals, but also have the potential
to fuel conflict.

\textbf{Scope of the Problem}

\textbf{Drug Trafficking}

Cocaine is the most lucrative TOC activi-
ty. By some estimates, the annual volume
of cocaine trafficked in 2010 globally was
in the range of 590 tons. This has an esti-
mated street value of $156 billion.\textsuperscript{7} While

coca is not cultivated or processed in Af-
rica, West Africa has recently emerged as
a transit point for cocaine from the An-
dean Region to markets in Europe. Co-
caine trafficking routes include Guinea-
Bissau, Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, Liberia and The Gambia, as well
as the Saharan states. In terms of the vol-
ume, it is estimated that over 25 tons of
cocaine were trafficked in 2009 through
West Africa, with an estimated street
value of $6.8 billion.\textsuperscript{8} To put this in per-
spective, the average annual income in
West Africa is around $900 as measured
in PPP (Purchasing Power Parity).\textsuperscript{9}

To be sure, there are clear distinctions
between drug-producing, drug-transit
and drugconsumer countries. These
distinctions present varied security and
governance challenges. For example,
while most drug producing countries
face significantly high risk of political
violence and destabilization, the risks
in transit and consumer countries are
different. Drug-related violence in these
countries consists mostly in competition
among drug cartels for territory and con-
tests between them and law enforcement
agencies, while drug money can also fuel
factional struggles within governments.

There is anecdotal evidence to suggest
cocaine trafficking has begun to rise in
recent years in West Africa, following a
decline after 2004. Some of the contribut-
ing factors for this increase are: closure
and increased security at older transit
routes and the opening of new routes
through porous borders and volatile re-
regions in Africa; and the emergence of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{5} Michael Kenney, From Pablo to Osama: Traffick-
\item \textsuperscript{6} United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UN-
\item \textsuperscript{7} Ibid., p. 22.
\item \textsuperscript{8} Ibid., p. 30.
\item \textsuperscript{9} \url{http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/GNI_PPP_of_countries.htm}
new markets in North Africa, Europe and Asia and Africa’s proximity to some of these new markets.\textsuperscript{10}

A disturbing trend is also taking place as organized criminal networks engaged in cocaine trafficking are setting up shop in new countries in Africa, taking advantage of state weakness and opportunities for corrupt practices. Recent seizures of cocaine within Libya’s borders provide one such example. Northern Mali had been a significant player in the global cocaine trade as the 2009 case of “Air Cocaine” illustrated.\textsuperscript{11} The recent conflict in the country raises a concern not only for the government but also its neighbors.

While many may take comfort in the fact that Africa by in large is a transit region for drug trafficking, and therefore should not expect political violence fuelled by drug production, its status may change sooner than many expect. Africa has one of the fastest growing middle class with increasingly high disposable income. If trends in the U.S. and Europe in the early ‘70s and ‘80s are any indication and that there is a direct relationship, other things being equal, between higher income and drug use, particularly cocaine use, African policy makers should be concerned. Having new cocaine markets within Africa may shift the role of criminal organizations from drug traffickers to retailers, with possible street violence and other social and security pathologies as a consequence.

However, scholars working on this issue have also challenged the alarmist predictions put forward by organizations such as the UN Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC), showing that these are not informed by African realities. Africa has a history of handling drug use issues more effectively than the “war on drugs” orthodoxy promoted by some western prohibitionist lobbies.\textsuperscript{12} This critique of international policy based on African experience underscores the importance of Africans analyzing their own problems, identifying the particular circumstances on the African continent, and designing policies in line with African realities and African interests.

\textbf{Mineral Resources}

Africa is also vulnerable to mineral and precious resources trafficking. In some instances, these types of TOC activities have fueled wars and conflict in the continent as diamond-fuelled wars in Angola and Sierra Leone or the oil-driven conflict in the Niger Delta demonstrated.

Accurate data is not available, but the example of the Democratic Republic of the Congo illustrates the lucrative business of mineral and natural resource trafficking can generate for warlords and insurgents. It is estimated that 40 tons of gold is trafficked out of the DRC with an estimated street value of $1.24 billion.\textsuperscript{13} The

\begin{flushright}

11. In November 2009, a Boeing 727 was found burned out near Gao, Mali with a large cargo of cocaine on board. The event, known as, “Air Cocaine”, led to investigations that revealed tons of cocaine were being flown directly from the West African coast to private airfields across the interior of West Africa and the Sahel. Source: Institute for Security Studies (ISS).


\end{flushright}
Transit and markets for mineral traffickers in the DRC stretches from Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, and Tanzania to the Middle East, Europe and South East Asia.

**Illegal arms trade**

The threat of illegal arms trafficking in small and light weapons (SALW) is a real threat to Africa. Out of the estimated 500 million SALW worldwide, 100 million are to be found in Africa.\(^{14}\) Central and East Africa in particular have excessively high amounts of weapons in civilian hands.\(^{15}\) It is not only SALWs that are cause for concern. The illegal sale of ammunition for SALWs is estimated to be $4.3 billion with overall parts and weapons’ component sales estimated at $9.7 billion for the periods between 2008–2011.\(^{16}\) But concerted efforts to curb illegal arms trafficking have been lackluster at best. There are several reasons for this: first, the volume of SALW trafficking in terms of money pales in comparison with other TOCs, namely, trafficking of cocaine and hence fails to meet the panic muster. Second, illegal arms sales does not happen in a continuous cycle, rather has a sporadic and periodic uptick in line with regional and internal dynamics. Third, most policymakers in Africa contend that the biggest arms traders are companies from the Permanent Members of the Security Council, namely, the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia and China and unless they curb their supply and sale of weapons to African states, eradicating illegal arms sales amounts to a drop in the bucket. The last point, while controversial in some policy corners, has some validity. The global arms trade is closely associated with corrupt practices.\(^{17}\) Additionally, an estimated $2.2 billion worth of arms were sold to countries under arms embargo during the period of 2007–2010 by companies within one or more of the three biggest arms trading countries and over $1.9 billion worth of excess weapons were dumped in African countries from 2008–2011, in exchange for various quid pro quos. Most of these weapons are believed to have made their way into the illegal market.\(^{18}\)

Recent developments in Tunisia, Libya, Central African Republic and Mali are cause for concern. The post-Qaddafi transition in Libya, for example, has engendered a plethora of militia groups, many of whom retain their arms and have access to caches of SALW, and indeed many heavy and crew-operated weapons systems as well. The sale of these weapons is an attractive source of income to many who have yet to be gainfully employed or have carved out a new line of profession for themselves. Further, organized criminal networks purchase these weapons in order to provide protection services for drug and human traffickers along transit routes stretching from West and East Africa to the Middle East and Europe. Finally, there is evidence that SALW trafficking is connected to terrorists and extremists.

---

15. UNDOC, February 2011, P. 27.
as well as other organized criminal networks, largely by the same actors, as the same groups expand their activities and thus their influence in the region.  

The fact remains that the plethora of SALW in states, particularly in fragile states, fuel ongoing conflicts and violence. According to the Africa Union, the SALW trafficking has “led to the development of a culture of violence that has destroyed the social fabric of many countries in Africa and undermined efforts at economic development, governance and democratization.”  

Arms trafficking in Africa is not simply a human security issue; it has socio-economic and development implications as well. Conflicts fuelled by arms trafficking are estimated to cost Africa at least $18 billion a year, almost completely cancelling out the amount provided in development aid and contracting African state’s economy by up to 15%.  

Human Trafficking

Despite significant efforts by governments, international agencies and NGOs, human trafficking is a major challenge in Africa. A distinction needs to be made here between people smuggling and people (human) trafficking. People smuggling consists of transporting people illegally from one country to another, for profit. This trade is fuelled by a combination of the poverty and desperation of people in sending countries, and the economic opportunities and demand for cheap labor in destination countries, mostly in North America, Europe and the growing economies of East Asia. Human (people) trafficking is a more disturbing variant, in which the victims are either held hostage and their relatives are extorted to pay ransoms, or they are sold into slavery, prostitution or forced labor, or have their organs removed for trade to hospitals for transplants. The victims of organ removal are then discarded and left to die a painful and lonely death.

The extent of human trafficking in Africa is difficult to gauge, in some regards, because most of the trafficking, kidnapping, torture and extortion happens to people who are extremely vulnerable and often invisible, including those who leave their home countries in order to seek refuge or asylum in other countries.

Figures for people smuggling are easier to estimate. The UN High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) estimates approximately 14.5 million people migrate per annum; 10 million of them moving from countries within the countries of East Africa. 34% of African countries are major sources for smuggling to Europe, including Morocco, Algeria, Congo, South Africa, Madagascar, Somalia, Eritrea and Nigeria. In addition, 26 percent – mostly in East Africa – are reported to be smuggled to Arab nations. The UNHCR and IOM (International Organization for Migration) estimate around 12,000 people from East Africa are stranded in the North of Yemen at the border with Saudi Arabia.  

---


22. UNHCR, 2012.

Arabia. Of those stranded, some presumably end up at the hands of criminal organizations engaged in human trafficking. These numbers, while estimates, reflect the magnitude of the problem.

There is anecdotal evidence to suggest an increase in human trafficking in Africa, particularly East Africa. The reasons for this increase are: first, increased border cooperation and controls have increased the risks of human trafficking thus increased the profitability of this criminal activity. Second, because of the increased risks in human trafficking, traffickers are becoming more organized and sophisticated establishing professional networks that transcend borders and regions. No longer are traffickers small, poorly-resourced disparate gangs trying to make a living, but reportedly well organized and coordinated international networks of smugglers and criminal gangs with significant financial capital.

It is estimated that trafficking in persons has an annual value between $7 and $10 billion. Third, these sophisticated networks allow traffickers to smuggle people, particularly women and girls for sexual exploitation and forced labor, farther into newer markets in the Middle East, Europe and Asia. According to some key informants who have managed to escape their captors, the criminal networks extend from Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, India, Eastern Europe and South East Asia. The phenomenon of killing abductees to remove their kidneys for organ transplants is growing fast, with private hospitals ready to pay tens of thousands of dollars for each organ.

While the majority of human trafficking in Africa occurs between countries in the region and with other countries in Europe, Asia and the Middle East, domestic trafficking also occurs on a large scale, as men, women and children are transported from rural to urban areas for forced labor and sexual exploitation. Prevailing conflicts in the countries or bordering the region offer fertile grounds for trafficking in persons. Women and children often end up in the hands of warlords, soldiers and rebels. They are abused as sex slaves, soldiers, forced laborers, carriers of ammunition and weapons, spies, and messengers. Children in armed conflicts are drawn into extreme violence and many are exposed to and become involved in drug abuse. Aside from the human tragedy, this experience makes children and young adults in particular more likely to become engaged in violent and criminal acts themselves, even after the conclusion of the armed conflict.

Lessons for Africa in Combating TOC
African policymakers have an opportunity to learn from other countries’ experiences in understanding the impact, distinct characteristics and strategies for combating TOC. Africa needs to first and foremost recognize the impact of TOC on security and governance in the con-

27. UNHCR, 2012.
tinent. This recognition is paramount for Africa because of the major impacts of TOC in conflict-affected and fragile states, which are disproportionately in Africa where 23 of the world's 28 fragile states are found.  

Conflict-affected and fragile states have weak and fragmented governments and institutions, significant internal divisions, high rate of poverty and lack of economic opportunities, particularly for youth. These conditions create conditions that are readily exploited by organized criminal networks. TOC in conflict-affected and fragile states also have the potential to destabilize stable neighboring countries.

Lessons for African states for combating TOC should begin by a thorough assessment of the currently dominant strategies and narratives. The dominant orthodoxy for combating TOC, assertively promoted by the U.S. and institutions such as the UN Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is a “law-and-order” approach. The approach presumes that a “war on drugs” can be won by police action—an account increasingly challenged by Latin American countries where the escalation of a militarized approach to drug interdiction has proved counterproductive.

The law and order approach also implies that states either have or should have the investigative, law enforcement and prosecutorial capabilities. It assumes that the national and international political and economic orders and institutions are fully legitimate and to be protected and supported. Such prescription, however, is ill-suited for some states in Africa, particularly for conflict-affected and fragile states and has the potential to reinforce historical enmities between the state and its citizens. Justice systems are often ineffective, while security and law enforcement forces often have a history of predatory and abusive behavior. Increasing the strength of these institutions that are already oriented against equitable, fair, or legitimate treatment for the majority of the population without a process to sensitize these institutions which includes accountability and transparency, could provide fodder for renewed violence or the backlash of a population that may perceive state actions to be biased and crackdowns on organized criminals to be a smokescreen for further marginalization of specific groups.

Policy frameworks for combating TOC emanating from international organizations such as UNODC need to be scrutinized by Africans, in the light of African interests and priorities. This process begins by Africans distinguishing between what is intrinsically criminal and against human rights and social ethics, in contrast to what is declared illegal by the global powers-that-be to protect their interests and policy priorities. Thus, for example, people trafficking is a criminal activity under any definition, but the smuggling of undocumented migrants to Europe is a byproduct of an inequitable economic system and “fortress Europe” migration policies geared to protecting labor markets. Such distinctions could help African states to insist on the design of a workable strategy geared to-

---

Towards practices that are criminal while recognizing others as arising out of global inequalities and the policy priorities of national and international forces. The former requires a robust national and international cooperation on many levels and a strong, accountable and transparent national law and order response, while the emphasis on the latter should be on addressing the root causes of inequalities and deprivation and structural measures to stamp out the conditions that allow these practices to arise.

Africa must also learn from the experience of Mexico and Colombia where Western, particularly, U.S. driven policies such as the “war on drugs” have militarized drug control. Part of the justification for a comprehensive and indiscriminate security crackdown on the narcotics business has been blurring the distinctions between the functions of violence in drug trafficking, drug-producing and drug-consuming countries.

Narratives about the nexus between TOC and insurgency should also be viewed in light of the lessons and experiences of other countries. In Latin America, Afghanistan and south-east Asia, for example, drug producing regions have been favored locales for insurgents, who are able to profit from the income streams provided. However, drug transit countries, such as in Central America, West Africa and elsewhere, do not tend to see drugs fuelling insurgencies. To the contrary, drugs traders prefer stable environments in which they can deal with established authorities, preferably through bribery and infiltration of government structures, sometimes at the highest levels.

Meanwhile, social and medical experts in drug consuming countries are increasingly arguing for a focus on harm reduction policies such as needle exchange and methadone treatment for addicts, and the lawful regulation of narcotics. The effectiveness of these measures, contrasted with the ineffectiveness of enforcing prohibition, leads towards the policy of decriminalizing personal drug use. However, decriminalization of drug use does not address the artificially high profits that accrue to drug producers and traders, and the corrupt and violent practices associated with their business. Those problems demand more far-reaching measures such as legalization and regulation of the entire business.

Recognition of these issues should allow African states to identify strategies that would be appropriate and effective for African conditions.

**African-led Solutions in Combating TOC**

There is no question that local law enforcement is critical to combating TOC. Efforts to capacitate security and judicial sectors for implementing an effective law-and-order approach, where that it is appropriate, must ensure integrity of these sectors and prevent impunity for criminal acts. However, such strategy must be part of a broader strategy designed along the lines of African interests and realities. Indigenous African-led solutions need to be formulated and supported. Unfortunately, the mainstream approaches for combating TOC are well financed and have the support of powerful interest-driven African and non-African institutions and actors. For-
Fortunately, Africa is not monolithic.

Africa has handled domestic drug issues in appropriate ways. For example, east African countries have not criminalized the production, transport and consumption of khat, knowing that to do so would generate social, economic and law enforcement problems.

The continent has also shown its effectiveness when it puts its effort into tackling regional and continent issues. The Kimberley Process designed to criminalize “blood diamonds” through effective means of certification at various levels is one such example. This initiative was instrumental in ensuring that legitimate diamond trade was protected, while “blood diamonds” become much harder to market. In contrast, Western driven advocacy efforts such as the “conflict minerals” campaign, rather than addressing the political and economic roots of these conflicts, have had the adverse impact of disincentivizing international companies from doing any business in African minerals, to the detriment of many countries in Africa. A similar certification system, along the lines of the Kimberley Process, for various natural resources including minerals, cigarettes, medicines and other commodities currently traded illegally, could help drive the illicit market out of business while supporting the legal market.

The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) of October 2006, as endorsed by many African states and the African Development Bank needs to be fully embraced and its principles adapted by African states. To date, only Liberia has become the first African country and the second country in the world to be designated as EITI compliant, setting an exemplary benchmark to other African countries. More African states should follow suit.

African communities and localities are also uniquely situated to be full partners in tackling TOC. In conflict-affected and fragile states, particularly, with severely compromised state institutions, people’s social contract with the states becomes breached and increasingly, people turn to the kinds of sectional and community loyalties that are their main recourse in times of insecurity, and their main default source of economic opportunity. As such, TOC prevention strategies must partner with communities and local leaders fully and not risk marginalizing them.

Combating TOC should also be fully integrated into the African Union’s peace operations. Already, there are similar discussions within the United Nations. Doing so will surely necessitate the collaboration of regional and international stakeholders making use of the full range of military, development and crime prevention tools available. However, the ownership and strategies for combating TOC would squarely lie within the AU and its Member States.

Many countries in Africa have comprehensive and effective national laws. However, national laws alone do not provide the full range of tools for combating TOC. Greater coordinated strategies, operational collaboration, mutual

legal assistance, including extradition agreements and information sharing must be forged between states. In instances where neighboring countries have poor diplomatic relations, regional institutions must play an active role in working together with both sides for a comprehensive strategy.

At the heart of most of the criminal activities in Africa is lack of economic opportunities. Thus, short-term TOC eradication strategies need to be complimented by long-term investments in communities and job creation, particularly for the youth. Overutilization of the terrorism and extremism prism in combating TOC may not appropriately capture the socio-economic dimensions of TOC.

Africa must refrain from focusing entirely on presumably high-value individual criminals, as illustrated in the U.S. and Mexico’s “war on drugs”. There has to be a recognition on the part of African policymakers that criminal organizations do not necessarily have a finite number of criminals and the problem will be solved when all have been killed or captured. A comprehensive strategy needs to look at the entire value chain of the criminal activity and, more importantly, the underlying causes of criminal activities.

Finally, greater cooperation in border control and management with the view to combating TOC needs to be at the heart of border delimitation and demarcation initiatives of Member States.
Annex III

Remarks by Thabo Mbeki at the Tana Forum on Security in Africa

“Security and Organized Crime in Africa”

Chairperson of our Session, President Pierre Buyoya,
Chairperson of the Board of the Tana Forum, President Olusegun Obasanjo,
Your Excellences, Heads of State and Government,
Distinguished participants,
Friends, ladies and gentlemen:

As others have observed, we meet here just over a month before our Continent celebrates the important 50th Anniversary of the OAU, and, in my view, belatedly celebrates the 10th Anniversary of the AU, which should have been done last year.

It is absolutely correct that as we celebrate these important Anniversaries, we must continue to reflect on the critical matter of the achievement of peace, security and stability throughout our Continent.

This is fundamental and inherent to the task to create the necessary conditions for us to address the historic task to achieve the fundamental socio-economic transformation of our Continent, in favour of the ordinary African working masses.

Recent and current examples of instability in various African countries point exactly to the continuing importance of this matter.

I refer here, among others, to:

- the recent and current events in Mali and the Central African Republic;
- the continuing conflict in Somalia;
- other violent conflicts such as those taking place within the DRC, the Republic of Sudan, the Republic of South Sudan, the Federal Republic of Nigeria, here in the Federal Republic of Ethiopia, and across a number of African borders, relating to the LRA;
- other conflicts, such as in the Casamance in Senegal;
- instances of electoral violence; and,
- periodic instances as happened when a terrorist group seized a gas production facility in Algeria, and yet another more recently, when many people were killed in Mombasa, Kenya.

Over the years, I have appreciated a slogan formulated by a group that broke away from the ANC, in 1959, the Pan African Congress – the PAC.

The PAC slogan to which I refer says: “Peace among the Africans: war against the enemy!”
Over the years, especially during the period of the Cold War, and since, it seemed to me that this slogan was absolutely correct and appropriate, and should serve side-by-side with the more popular slogan – “Africa Must Unite”!

As we meet here today at the important Tana Forum, I think we must ask ourselves the question, and answer this question honestly – is it possible now and the near future to achieve the objective of peace among the Africans!

It is logical that, in similar manner, we must pose to ourselves the directly related question – who and what are the opponents or obstacles to the achievement of this peace among the Africans, and therefore the enemy against which, and whom, we must wage war!

I believe that there is no obvious answer to these two symbiotic and important questions.

I would like to believe that it was because of this that the 2009 AU “Tripoli Declaration on the Elimination of Conflicts in Africa and the Promotion of Sustainable Peace” stated that the achievement of these objectives posed an “intellectual challenge…to arrive at African-centred solutions, drawing from our own distinctive and unique experience.”

Surely, in the first instance, that “intellectual challenge” means that we, the Africans, should understand all the things that make for peace, and those that do not make for peace among ourselves as Africans.

As I worked to prepare my remarks for this Session, I came across an authoritative analytical piece of research on the matter of peace on our Continent written, interestingly, by a US academic, in 2010, Professor Scott Straus.

I would like to confess that the general comments I will now make about the generics of the violent conflicts on our Continent are largely based on this Straus ‘monograph’.

The topic I was asked to address, the specific theme of this Session, suggests that there is a vitally important and direct link between African Peace and Security on one hand, and Organised Crime on our Continent, on the other. I must therefore make at least a preliminary comment in this regard.

I agree, without equivocation, that we must indeed discuss this possible linkage or nexus.

Later, I will address this specific matter in greater detail.

However, I would like to say that it does not seem that organised crime, especially as it also relates to terrorism, is a decisive factor with regard to instability throughout the generality of our Continent.

In this regard some important research has made the important point that

– “the available evidence does not, however, conclusively establish a ‘close connection’ between (organised crime and terrorism); even the nature of the link, if any, has yet to be adequately demonstrated.

“Any exploration of the relationship has to recognise that organised crime is multi-faceted, and includes activities that are often not necessarily connected. While some of these activities may be suscepti-
ble to exploitation to support terrorism, others will not.

“In addition, there is a noticeable difference (to publicity) in the attitude of crime syndicates on the one hand, and terrorist groups on the other.

“(Crime) Syndicates thrive on concealment of their exploits (to avoid the attention of law enforcement), whereas publicity tends to be the stock-in-trade of terrorism.

“This is not to say that organised crime and terrorism are not connected...We have taken the view that it would be prudent to treat organised crime and terrorism as distinct, but related elements.”


I agree with these comments.

Nevertheless, I will revert back to this matter later, especially with regard to the situation in West Africa and elsewhere, some of whose elements stand contrary to the view I have cited about the disconnect between organised crime, terrorism and instability in Africa.

I would now like to return to the ‘monograph’ by Prof Straus which I mentioned earlier.

Some of what this ‘monograph’ says correctly, clearly based on extensive and credible research, which I have not conducted, and have had no possibility to conduct, is that we must take great care to differentiate among different forms and sources of violence on our Continent, located within different historical periods.

In the Abstract summarising the article, Straus says:

“Contrary to common assumption, major forms of large-scale organized political violence in sub-Saharan Africa are declining in frequency and intensity, and the region is not uniquely prone to the onset of warfare. African civil wars in the late 2000s were about half as common compared to the mid-1990s.

“The character of warfare has also changed. Contemporary wars are typically small-scale, fought on state peripheries and sometimes across multiple states, and involve factionalized insurgents who typically cannot hold significant territory or capture state capitals.

“Episodes of large-scale mass killing of civilians are also on the decline. “That said, other forms of political violence that receive less attention in the academic literature are increasing or persistent.

“These include electoral violence and violence over access to livelihood resources, such as land and water.

“While primarily descriptive, the article posits that geo-political shifts since the end of the Cold War are a leading candidate to explain the changing frequency and character of warfare in sub-Saharan Africa.”

An additional and important point which Straus makes is that almost all the wars on our Continent during the last 50 years have been civil wars, rather than inter-state conflicts.

I think that perhaps the only exceptions in this regard would be the 1963 short so-called Sand War between Algeria and
Morocco, the 1977/1978 Ethiopian/Somali war, the Libyan-generated conflict between Chad and Libya between the years 1978 to 1987, the 1978-1979 Ugandain/Tanzania war, the Eritrea/Ethiopia war of May 1998 to June 2000, and the so-called Second Congo War in the DRC, which began in 1998.

However the fact of these inter-state wars does not change the fact that the bulk of the armed conflicts on our Continent during our years of independence have been intra-state in character.

Accordingly, my comments will not address the matter of inter-state conflicts.

In the context of the tasks of the Tana Forum, I would now like to cite what an historic European and world revolutionary, Karl Marx, wrote in an instructive treatise during the 19th Century:

“The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways: the point (however) is to change it.”

(“Karl Marx: Theses on Feuerbach.”)

I have no doubt that Professor Straus has helped us to understand (and therefore interpret) our Continent, perhaps in his own way.

However, the task remains in our hands to change our Continent and condition.

We must therefore answer the vitally important question, which only we can answer – what is to be done!

The fundamental proposition I would like to make in this regard is that what lies at the base of intra-state conflicts we must address is our African reality that speaks to a matter that is fundamental to Africa’s future, including the important and critical striving towards the unity of our Continent.

I speak here of what historically, in progressive discourse and literature, has been categorised as – the national question!

This relates to the important matter on which surely we must reflect, of the formation of the African ‘nation state’.

A hundred years ago, in 1913, during a period of fundamental social transformation in Europe, the Russian revolutionary, Vladimir Lenin, published his “Theses on the National Question”.

Among others, discussing the polity in some European and Asian countries, neighbours and part of the Russian empire, he wrote:

“In countries bordering on Russia - the bourgeois-democratic reform of the State that has everywhere else in the world led, in varying degree, to the creation of independent national States or States with the closest, interrelated national composition, has either not been consummated or has only just begun…”

I would like to propose that we too, the Africans, must make our own assessment about whether “bourgeois-democratic” (or “proletarian”), or other reform of the African State has created the ‘States with the closest, interrelated national composition’ – the very foundation of the contemporary European States, including Lenin’s Russia!

I am certain that all of us will readily agree that, as Lenin suggested, the formation of such States on our Continent has ‘not yet been consummated or has only just begun’.”
The collapse of the State in Libya, in the aftermath of the deliberate destruction of the Gaddafi regime, demonstrated this reality.

This confirmed the fact of the fractious tribal base on which the Libyan State was based, of which many among the African intelligentsia were aware.

I would therefore like to argue that it is because independent Africa has failed to address the ‘national question’ in our countries, within the complex and diverse reality of our States, that we have had the intra-state violent conflicts which the Tana Forum correctly seeks to bring to an end.

Accordingly, I believe that the Tana Forum must discuss this ‘national question’, seriously, as part of the response to the “intellectual challenge” to us as Africans requested of us by the ‘Tripoli Declaration’.

In this regard, the Tana Forum must pose and answer the critical question, honestly and frankly, – what constitutes ‘the national question’ in Africa, to which I have referred?

Mahmood Mamdani begins the Chapter “Beyond Settlers and Natives” in his book “Define and Rule...” with this paragraph:

“Decolonisation was the preoccupation of two groups that propelled the nationalist movement: the intelligentsia and the political class. They set out to create the nation, the former to give the independent state a history and the latter to create a common citizenship as the basis of national sovereignty. Both projects unravelled in the thick of civil war. It is time to ask: what have we learned? How far have we gone beyond settler claims to being custodians of cosmopolitan pluralism and nativist preoccupation with origin and authenticity?”

Later he says: “One country, mainland Tanzania, led by Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, successfully implemented an alternative form of statecraft...(and) Nyerere’s seminal achievement (was) creating an inclusive citizenship and building a nation-state.”

He concludes this Chapter in these words:

“Whether or not Nyerere’s achievement, the creation of a common political citizenship and law-based order, turns out to be durable will depend on the capacity of subsequent generations to fashion a politics beyond the nation-state, one equal to realising social justice.”

The central proposition I would like to advance relating to the focus of the Tana Forum is that by and large our Continent has not succeeded to create what Prof Mamdani described as “a common political citizenship and a law-based order...a nation-state equal to realising social justice”.

This is what I have characterised as a failure successfully and correctly to address ‘the national question’.

Accordingly, we must, at least, try to answer the question – what does this mean?

I will therefore attempt to respond to this question – perhaps in a way that is crude and primitive - but hopefully in a manner sufficient to engage the Tana Forum in a productive conversation.
Well over 30 years ago, in the context of the liberation of Moçambique, our close sister liberation movement, FRELIMO, propagated what was to us a very attractive slogan – “For the Nation to live, the Tribe must die!”

You will of course understand why this slogan was appealing to us. This was because we were members of the liberation movement, the ANC, which stated at its very foundation, in 1912, that one of its central objectives was “to bury the demon of tribalism”!

I would like to imagine that the sentiment that the tribe must die served to convey the aspiration of nation-building for which Mwalimu Julius Nyerere worked, exactly to bury the demon of tribalism, or otherwise address what I have described as the national question.

But indeed, as Professor Mamdani shows in the book I have cited, it is not enough merely to express the wish for the success of the nation-building project. It has to be worked for.

I would like to suggest that it is fundamentally the incompleteness of the nation-building project which lays the basis for the intra-state conflicts, sometimes escalating into civil wars, of which I have spoken.

(Needless to say, of course here I exclude the national liberation wars for independence from colonialism and white minority rule.)

The failure to create a ‘common political citizenship and a law-based order’ results or manifests itself in the creation of tribally (‘ethnically’) based political factions.

Once any of these factions accedes to power, even through ‘democratic elections’, having based itself on so-called ethnic mobilisation, it then proceeds to implement measures to advantage its base and disadvantage the rest.

Inevitably, this results, among others, in corrupt practice.

Inter alia, this will lead to the abuse of political power for the rapacious enrichment of a small group, the severe compromise of the integrity of the state machinery, and failure to address the fundamental socio-economic interests of the population as a whole, including the ‘dominant ethnic’ group.

Necessarily this helps to mobilise the population, defined as opposed ‘ethnic groups’, into bitter struggles for access to resources, including land, and what has been described as ‘electoral violence’, as we saw in Kenya in 2007.

It also points to the emergence of class divisions, built on the basis of the failure to solve the national question. Out of this emerges the so-called bureaucratic bourgeoisie, which will happily enrich itself at the expense of the people as a whole, with no regard for any ‘ethnic identity’.

This parasitic ‘bourgeoisie’ will also happily cooperate with international capital to conduct rapine, in its selfish interest, obviously in a manner which undermines national sovereignty.

The reality I have sought to describe is that ‘ethnic mobilisation’ is used in many of our countries by our national elites to gain access to political power, and to use such power both to perpetuate their hold on this power and to use it
for self-enrichment, against the interests of the majority of the population.

This self-enrichment takes many forms and benefits a fairly significant section of the population. This segment of the population earns its income from Government employment and access to the benefits of the economic activities of the State.

In this regard we must keep in mind that at our stage of development, the State is the single most important actor in our national economies.

Access to political power, in the context of the paradigm I have described, becomes the only available route to access the resources to achieve the objective of a better life for the citizen.

This lays exactly the basis for the disadvantaged to resort to non-peaceful means to redress this fundamental wrong which defines large sections of the population as practically falling outside the compass of “the common political citizen”.

Accordingly, I would like to repeat that to address the vitally important matter of peace and security on our Continent, we must take on board the hard reality is that we have to confront the fact of the failure successfully to address the national question in the greater part of Africa.

Again to resort to Professor Mamdani’s suggestion, I am proposing that for our Continent fundamentally to address the matter of peace and security, it must pay special attention to the challenge to create “a common political citizenship and a law-based order...a nation-state equal
to realising social justice”.

In this regard, the Tana Forum has correctly accepted the proposition about the “intellectual challenge” to ourselves as Africans, as contained in the “Tripoli Declaration”.

I would therefore like to suggest that this Forum, whose mission is peace and security on our Continent – ‘peace among the Africans’ - must undertake a systematic “intellectual” study of African experience, as suggested in the “Tripoli Declaration”, based, in the first instance, on the thesis advanced by Professor Mamdani – what I have summarised as ‘the solution of the national question’ in Africa.

I would like to believe that among others, as an example, this study would also reflect on the relevant and instructive experience of the sister country of Sierra Leone, which was ultimately condemned to live through a very destructive civil war.

I mention this in part because a good part of the account relating to the intra-state conflict in Sierra Leone is contained in documents published by that country’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (SL TRC), which are available on the Internet. (www.sierraleonetrc.org).

To give an example about what I am talking about, I will cite only one comment made by Mr John Benjamin to the Commission.

He described himself in these terms: “I was appointed to serve my country in various capacities during the National Provisional Ruling Council military regime, 1992 – 1996. I served that regime
as Chief Secretary of State, Secretary of State Chairman’s Office and Secretary General at various times.”

In other words he served in the top echelon of the administration which served the then military administration, and was therefore an important player within the Sierra Leone State.

In his submission to the TRC he reflected on many of the antecedents which led the formation of the military regime in which he served, and the subsequent civil war.

Specifically, in this regard, I would like to cite an instructive paragraph in his submission, in which he refers to two historic Sierra Leone political parties, or factions, these being the All Peoples Congress (APC) and the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP).

Before I quote this paragraph, I must mention that Mr Benjamin, because he was talking to other Sierra Leones, did not mention that these parties were largely based on distinct and major ‘tribal/ethnic groups’, located in specific regions of the country, with the APC being the political Party of the Temnes, and the SLPP the Party of the Mendes.

In his submission to the SL TRC he said:

“It is necessary to note that in 1967 the APC swept the polls in the North and the Western Area, the latter region providing most of the qualified personnel of the Judiciary. The APC found it less difficult to get the judiciary on its side in its bid to punish SLPP staunch supporters and party members.

“Ever since there has been this vicious circle, using the Judiciary to vilify political opponents. Treason trials in this country since then have been in most cases a matter of using the courts to get rid of political opponents.

“The laws are there to ensure this. Legal reform has been a thing to which we only pay lip service.

“Today, if anything, we must be able to learn from the fate of Brigadier Lansana, Brigadier John Bangura, Sorie Fornah, Francis Minah and those who lost their lives in other coups.

“These flaws in our laws must be arrested now if our democracy should work. The Honourable Judges must not allow themselves to be submissive to the whims and caprices of the Executive.”

This submission makes an unequivocal statement, based on practical and painful African experience, about the fact of the African polity being based on tribalism/ethnicity, thus resulting in the failure to achieve the objective of “a common political citizenship and a law-based order…a nation-state equal to realising social justice”.

As I have promised, I must now address the other element of my subject organised crime as an important element with regard to the basic challenge of security on our Continent.

It is absolutely correct that organised crime, as I have earlier described it, plays a significant role in terms of destabilising some of our countries, thus negatively to contribute to the more universal phenomenon of the absence of peace and stability in Africa.
However, evidence suggests that this phenomenon is largely confined to some of the countries of the Sahel, Nigeria and Somalia.

With regard to the Sahel, it would seem that this organised crime did not emerge as an autonomous phenomenon.

Rather, it grew out of the failure successfully to address the national question in various countries of the Sahel, relating to the diverse Tuareg/Berber population which straddles the entirety of the Sahara Desert, north and south.

It would seem to me that despite this, these rebellions, until more recently in Mali, and perhaps in Chad, much earlier, were not intimately involved in attempts to bring about ‘regime change’ in our various countries.

Rather, they were about establishing inclusive societies – the ‘common political citizenship’ which Mahmoud Mamdani wrote about.

Thus, I would like to believe that these rebellions, whatever their consequences and evolution, were born out of the failure successfully to address the national question in the African countries concerned.

However, it also seems to be true that when organised crime becomes entrenched, as reflected in the trade in narcotics in Guinea Bissau and northern Mali, the criminals can themselves be the driving force in terms of creating instability in particular States.

This is well illustrated in a very informative September 2012 article by Wolfram Lacher of the Carnegie Endowment, entitled “Organised Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara Region”.

For instance he writes:

“The link between organized crime and conflict is obvious in the kidnapping-for-ransom business operated by AQIM (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) and MUJAO (Movement for Tawhid and Jihad in West Africa.) However, tensions related to the growing drug traffic, and the erosion of state institutions through complicity with organized crime, played even more important a role in the dynamics that led to the outbreak of conflict in northern Mali in January 2012. Officials’ collusion with organized crime of all sorts has been present to varying degrees across the region.

“Organized crime truly began to take hold in northern Mali at the time of a rebellion led by several Tuareg officers from Kidal, a northern region bordering both Niger and Algeria, that began in May 2006. While the outbreak of the rebellion was due to wider political grievances, rivalries over the control of smuggling gradually became more prominent in the dynamics of the conflict. The rising profits to be made from drug smuggling spawned a drive by different networks to control smuggling routes or to impose transit fees on smugglers from other groups. The Malian leadership deliberately exploited these tensions to exert its influence by playing leaders from certain communities against others and relying on select tribes to keep the north under control.

“Rivalries over the control of smuggling...
and state officials’ tolerance of criminal activity by political allies allowed extremist groups to flourish. The complicity and involvement of Malian officials, and the willingness of Western governments to pay ransoms, also caused the kidnapping industry to thrive. Moreover, these factors were key to the dynamics that caused the eruption of renewed conflict in northern Mali in 2012.”

I believe that it would also be correct to say that much of the instability in the Niger Delta in Nigeria can be attributed to organised crime which is focused on the theft of crude oil, the so-called bunkering.

Of additional concern to all of us must be the danger that organised crime related to oil bunkering could spread throughout the oil-producing region of the Gulf of Guinea.

The collapse of the State and the protracted violent conflict in Somalia also led to the prevalence of the criminal phenomenon of piracy on the high seas. However, I am not able to indicate whether any of the money accrued from this activity helped in any way to finance the continuing conflict.

Of concern also must be the emergence of jihadist organisations which we have to factor in among the players in the instability on our Continent. In this regard, of course all of us will recall the costly conflict in Algeria which started in 1991 and lasted an entire decade.

Today we would pay particular focus to Al-Shabaab in Somalia, AQIM and its offshoots and allies in the Sahel, and Boko Haram in Nigeria, as well as their international connections.

When NATO decided to intervene in Libya to overthrow the Libyan Government, many of us who were opposed to this intervention, warned about the negative consequences this would have not only on Libya, but also in her neighbourhood, including the Sahel as a whole.

Today no honest person can dispute the correctness of this prediction, part of whose result has been the current crisis in Mali, rooted among others, in the flow of armed combatants and weapons into Mali.

Accordingly, we must also factor this among the actors of instability we must confront.

Of broader significance is a development that I believe must be of grave concern to all of us. I am speaking here about Africa’s relations with the rest of the world, especially the West.

In this regard, in an article published in September last year by the South African periodical, The Thinker, to mark the 10th anniversary of the AU, I said:

“It is inevitable that the West will do its best to exploit its historical relations with Africa, using its so-called ‘soft power’, further to tie Africa to itself as its dependency.

“As it has demonstrated with regard to the Libyan conflict, where this fails or does not work, the West will intervene in Africa as it wishes, taking advantage of our weakness, wilfully to remove any African government it does not like, and thus position itself as the real determinent of the destiny of Africa!
“Thus do we come full circle back to the issue of vital strategic importance to ourselves as Africans of the fearless defence of our right to self-determination, so firmly represented by the establishment of the African Union.”

To conclude, I would like to make a few remarks.

The first of these is that the matter of peace and stability in any country and everywhere on our Continent must indeed be a matter of Continental concern, and must therefore serve as a central point of focus of the African Union.

Accordingly, the AU must further develop its capacity for ‘early warning’, ‘preventive diplomacy’, and conflict resolution.

Related to this, the second remark I would like to make is that we must move away from the wrong thinking I believe has entrenched itself in our thinking, that our strategic task with regard to the challenge of peace and stability on our Continent is peace-keeping – making peace after conflict has broken out!

My third remark is that we must take this fully on board that the fundamental cause of the absence of peace and stability on our Continent is internal to our Continent, even as this might be exploited by foreign powers to serve their interests.

This concerns the central matter of creating what Professor Mamdani characterised as “a common political citizenship and a law-based order...a nation-state equal to realising social justice”.

The great advantage we have in this regard is that, through the OAU and the AU, our Continent has approved as policies binding on all our States, a whole plethora of relevant Agreements. These address exactly the matters to which Mahmood Mamdani referred, as well as what needs to be done directly to confront the matters of peace and stability, including terrorism and organised crime.

The fourth remark I would like to make is that we must continue to insist on the correct proposition about “African solutions for African problems”.

Fundamentally this has to do with our right to self-determination as Africans, the right and duty to determine our destiny which we dare not surrender to anybody, under any circumstances.

This imposes the obligation on us practically to take our destiny into our own hands, bearing in mind the hard fact that Africa is part of, and effectively and shamefully, currently, a junior part of a globalised and globalising world from which she cannot extricate herself.

I believe that I can say this with no fear of contradiction, that the one billion African masses expect of their leadership, in all its formations and echelons, sustained action to achieve what generations of African thinkers have characterised as the renaissance of Africa, in all its complexity.

Indeed, as Karl Marx advised, we must both interpret our world and act to change it!

Thank you.
Next month, we will gather in Addis Ababa to celebrate the golden jubilee of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). This year of Pan Africanism and the African Renaissance will be a momentous occasion for us to reaffirm our shared commitment to a united and integrated Continent as well reflect and prepare for the next fifty years. Our shared histories and values must inform Africa’s renaissance towards a more secure, prosperous, and empowered Continent.

Building from the 2009 African Union (AU) Tripoli Declaration, *On The Elimination of Conflicts in Africa and the Promotion of Sustainable Peace*, it is right that this Forum should underscore the necessity for us as Africans collectively to apply and utilise our intellectual and moral capacities towards resolving the challenges that confront us in terms of peace and security. Moreover, this session of the Forum will allow us to continue working towards the late Prime Minister Zenawi’s vision of a developed, uplifted, and renewed Africa.

Since last year’s inaugural session of the Tana High-Level Forum, our Continent has witnessed a host of developments that sharply bring into focus us the issues of security and organised crime. From the on-going military intervention in Mali, to the sustained security challenges faced in such countries as Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, we as Africans remain acutely aware of how such developments shape and influence the peace and security agenda not simply within our countries, but more broadly, in terms of our Continent and the world at large.

To begin exploring the nexus between security and organised crime, we could first reflect upon the words of our late African visionary, Professor Chinua Achebe. He was not only a profound writer whose words touched the lives of millions, but was also among the Continent’s foremost thinkers and critics, a man who held steadfast to his vision of a liberated and prosperous Africa, led by Africans:

“Oh, the most important thing about myself is that my life has been full of changes. Therefore, when I observe the world, I don’t expect to see it just like I was seeing the fellow who lives in the next room. There is this complexity which seems to me to be part of the meaning of existence and everything we value.” (Chinua Achebe)

Within our attempts to address some of the Continent’s most pressing security challenges, we must continuously inter-
rogate the inherent complexities in the world around us. It will be impossible for us to forge a more secure Africa without first examining the diverse and converging forces that will impact on what we do today.

Reflecting upon such objective realities, we can identify a number of broad and complex forces that determine the conditions we face today:

- The world population, currently just above 7 billion people, is growing exponentially. It took 100 years for our world to expand from 1 billion to 2 billion people; only 30 years to expand from 2 billion to 3 billion people, and so on. It is projected that within 13 years, around the year 2025, the planet’s population will exceed 8 billion people. As a result, humanity must balance the increasing competition over the planet’s finite natural resources with their sustainable and equitable management.

- Rapid transformations in information and communication technologies, as well as the proliferation of affordable mobile devices, now connect billions of individuals in an instantaneous and unprecedented manner.

- The processes of globalisation are increasingly interconnecting all societies throughout the world, creating enormous potential for mutual benefits, even as they also entrench inequality between and within countries. Actions no longer occur in isolation. The literal and analytical boundaries that once confined our understandings of peace, security, and development are quickly dissipating.

- Africa continues to find herself in a geopolitical power imbalance vis-a-vis the Western world. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which is mandated by international law to be the principle guarantor of peace and security, is currently dominated by the forces of what has been called *post-modern imperialism*. I have previously interrogated this paradigm as a movement by which Western countries, namely the P3 of the United States, the UK, and France, actively intervene to determine the trajectory of the African continent so as to uphold their own vision of a properly functioning global system, without adherence to the aspirations of Africans as expressed through the AU. (Mbeki, *Between Internal Reform and External Intervention: Makerere University*, 2012).

Comprehensively to address Africa’s security challenges, we must therefore frame our conceptual understanding of security, our assessments of the threats to security, and our solutions to address such threats within these complex objective realities.

We must first ask ourselves what we mean when we invoke the notion of security: Does it exclusively entail the maintenance of law and order? Does our understanding of security change within different geographical and cultural contexts? These are among the fundamental questions that we must all continuously examine.

The best way to achieve the goals of a
peaceful and prosperous continent, with these goals set by ourselves as Africans, we must expand our understanding of security to incorporate the broader conceptual frameworks of human security.

We, as Africans, are already aware that the concept of security extends beyond the dimensions of rule of law and military or violent engagements. The 1991 Kampala Document, convened under the auspices of the African Leadership Forum, the OAU, and the UN Economic Commission for Africa, asserted that:

The security of a nation must be construed in terms of the security of the individual citizen to live in peace with access to the basic necessities of life while fully participating in the affairs of his/her society in freedom and enjoying all fundamental human rights. (The Kampala Document, 1991, p.12)

Human security, as formally defined by the United Nations Development Programme, is a re-conceptualisation of security that is people centred, multi-dimensional, inter-connected, and universal. (UNDP, The Human Security Framework and National Human Development Reports 2006).

Upon the concept’s first appearance within the 1994 Human Development Report, UNDP noted the following crucial insights that guided its decision to expand the basic definition of security, in order to account for the increasing complexities in our world. It explained:

“Human security is relevant to people everywhere, in rich nations and in poor. The threats to their security may differ … but these threats are real and growing…

When the security of people is attacked in any corner of the world, all nations are likely to get involved. Famines, ethnic conflicts, social disintegration, terrorism, pollution, and drug trafficking are no longer isolated events, confined within national borders. Their consequences travel the globe.

It is less costly and more humane to meet these threats upstream rather than downstream, early rather than late. Short-term humanitarian assistance can never replace long term development support.”

Almost twenty years later, these same insights reverberate with even greater force and relevance. The inherent complexities of an increasingly growing, globalised, and imbalanced 21st century necessitate an inclusive perspective on, as well as a more comprehensive engagement with the notion of security. No longer can security be conceptualised or addressed in isolation from broader processes and commitments to human and social development.

Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen similarly echoes the inextricable link between security and development. In discussions around his seminal work, Freedom as Development, Sen explains:

“A broader understanding of human security is extremely important precisely because it affects human lives. The idea of what is called “national security” is somewhat more remote from human lives, in the sense that it is often defined in terms of military preparedness and other features of national policy…

The idea of freedom is very broad and deals with freedom from insecurity as well as freedom to enhance general living conditions and people’s ability to do what they value doing and have reason to pursue.” (Amartya Sen,
Surely, such security is an invaluable public good. It has been codified within international law through the creation of the UN with its Security Council, and is enshrined within both the UN Charter and the UN Declaration of Human Rights.

Despite our diverse identities, we as Africans must uphold our obligation of maintaining security as a public good to both our fellow African brothers and sisters as well as to the Continent itself. We must undertake this responsibility not merely on account of our common histories, but also in the hope of positively influencing the development trajectories we all seek to navigate.

We must therefore articulate our shared peace and security challenges in terms of the overarching development perspective of human security. As peace and security are inextricably intertwined with political stability, economic security and institutional and socio-economic development across the Continent, it becomes necessary to view these concerns, first and foremost, as issues of development.

It goes without question that the countries of Africa continue to face considerable challenges towards guaranteeing human security. It is precisely for this reason that the Tana Forum was established, to develop new and innovative solutions to a series of inherently complex and dangerous security threats.

But we must also ask ourselves why Africa continues to face such great obstacles in achieving peace, security, and development throughout our Continent? We are all aware that Africa’s conflicts manifest themselves in the terrible loss of life, widespread human displacement, the deterioration of state capacity and infrastructure, and environmental destruction, among other challenges. When societies are structured so that that access to wealth, income, and opportunities are determined according to identities and not merit, those marginalised communities will naturally use any and every means necessary to combat unjust systems. And unless fundamental shifts towards inclusive institutions and societies are implemented in earnest, these conflicts will remain entrenched and recur in vicious cycles.

It is within these environments, defined by vicious cycles of conflict, that organised crime flourishes. As explored within this Forum’s concept note, we can understand a broad definition of what constitutes organised crime, such that: *transnational, national, or local groups functioning within a formal structure for the purpose of engaging in politically or economically motivated unlawful activity.*

Therefore, to interrogate the causes of and develop effective solutions to widespread organised criminal activities we must not only examine these challenges through the top-down approach of ensuring physical security, but also through the bottom-up perspectives of promoting inclusive development and human security.

In this light, we should articulate five crucial arguments in order to examine the nexus of organised crime and security on the African continent.

• The challenges of organised crime
are not exclusively African problems and are driven by broader geo-political and socio-economic dynamics beyond African shores,

- These challenges distinctly impact Africa and her people,
- Africans have successfully identified the existence and persistence of such problems,
- Africans have developed solutions to address these challenges,
- And, Africans must be the drivers of the solutions to these challenges, but cannot be expected to successfully resolve them alone.

Through these arguments, we can evaluate incidences of organised crime as part and parcel of larger global dynamics that are exacerbated on the African continent. Crucially, organised crime is both a symptom and a cause of the challenges in constructing inclusive, dynamic, and prosperous African countries.

A 2010 UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) brief entitled Crime and Instability: Case Studies of Transnational Threats summarises the deleterious impact on transnational organised crime, which remain especially relevant:

“Transnational organised crime can present a major challenge even where the state is strong, but when, for a variety of reasons, the rule of law is already weakened, it can pose a genuine threat to stability. As this crime further undermines governance and stability, countries can become locked in a vicious circle where social trust is lost and economic growth undermined…

But conflict zones are not the only places where transnational organized crime can pose a threat to the state. There are a number of areas around the world where criminals have become so powerful that, rather than seeking to evade the government, they begin to directly confront it. In these cases, a pattern of symptoms is typically manifest. Investigators, prosecutors, and judges who pursue organized criminals are threatened and killed. Journalists and activists may also be targeted. Corruption is detected at the highest levels of government, and law enforcement can become paralysed by mistrust. Portions of the country may effectively drift beyond state control.”

To begin to address the specific nature of organised crime in Africa, we must first acknowledge the unequivocal reality that such illicit activities are driven and reinforced by larger dynamics and interests throughout the world. It is important that we not only seek measurement of its impact on the African Continent, but also an understanding of its relationship to and intersection with interests outside of the Continent.

Africa loses over $50 billion USD each year from illicit financial outflows, an important part of which is driven by factions of organised crime. The importance of stemming these losses cannot be understated. These outflows undermine the development of our governance institutions, weaken our ability to combat poverty, reduce our investment and resource bases, and force us continuously to rely upon international financial support to advance our own basic development and security. We can no longer rely on others to determine our own fates. We must take charge of
our own destinies, as Africans, if we want to achieve a liberated and prosperous Continent.

Now place these losses within the greater global context. In the year 2009, $870 billion USD - one and a half percent of global GDP, more than six times the amount of all official development assistance issued in that year - was generated by transnational organised crime throughout the world (UNODC Transnational Organised Crime – Fact Sheet).

This is a crucial, yet unsurprising statistic, given that strands of organised crime within Africa are inherently interwoven into broader global dynamics specifically, through economic forces of global supply and demand for illicit goods and services.

For instance, human trafficking is readily described as one of the most pernicious activities on Earth. Often described as modern-day slavery, Africa and the entire world have a stark moral obligation to take all actions necessary towards the elimination of this illicit trade.

Even to begin combating human trafficking in Africa, we must accept that it is a globalised phenomenon, of which Africa only plays one part. According to the International Labour Organisation, an estimated 20.9 million people around the world are victims of forced or sexual labour. What is even more horrific is that these statistics only capture the known number of trafficked individuals, with millions more likely to remain undocumented throughout the duration of their captivity.

Further, the 2012 UN Global Trafficking Report, authored by UNODC, charts all of the known illicit trafficking routes, determining that between 2007 and 2010, victims from 136 different nationalities were identified in 118 countries worldwide. The report also identified approximately 460 distinct human trafficking flows.

Similarly, it was estimated in 2010 that somewhere between 153-300 million individuals aged 15-64 (approximately 3.4 - 6.6 percent of the world’s population) used an illicit drug at least once in the previous year, with the largest markets for importing such drugs existing in North America, South America, and Europe. (World Drug Report 2012, UN Office on Drug and Crime).

In this manner, we must accept that the extent of organised crime is not just a phenomena found in Africa, but one that is prevalent throughout the world. This complexity must continuously inform our perceptions of the nature and scope of the problems we face, but also the solutions we devise to address these challenges.

While remaining cognisant of the global reach and prevalence of organised crime, however, it remains undeniable that these challenges impact disproportionately on Africa and her people.

Organised crime breeds many of the challenges we see across the Continent, such as the presence of cross-border rebel movements, the growth and proliferation of extremism, the institutionalisation of violence through illicit economic or politically-motivated activities, the trafficking of illegal narcotics, arms and human beings, and the illegal deple-
tion of natural resources through poaching and illegal mining activities.

And thus the widespread prevalence of organised crime within Africa is inextricably interlinked with the challenges our countries face in strengthening functioning political institutions, promoting widespread human security, and redressing systematic inequalities. Threats of organised crime are intrinsically connected to broader considerations of development and must ultimately be confronted in a collective and comprehensive manner. Due to our shared histories, characterised by the struggle for liberation in the face of imperialist and colonial forces, some of African states remain mired in political, economic and civil institutional underdevelopment.

There is also much to be celebrated in terms of our collective endeavours to strengthen Africa’s responses to these challenges. Africa’s peace and security architecture, coordinated through the AU and its building blocks, the regional economic communities (RECs), are indeed a robust foundation from which to build solutions.

The African Peace and Security Architecture, as constituted through the AU Commission, the Peace and Security Council, the African Standby Force, the Panel of the Wise, and the Continental Early Warning System, mark a continental consensus and institutionalised response to managing conflict, including organised criminal activities. As the AU is essentially the sum total of our collective strengths and weaknesses, we must endeavour to constantly innovate comprehensive solutions that draw upon the strength of our vision of a peaceful and prosperous Africa.

We would therefore do well to combat the scourge of organised crime not solely through directed interventions, but rather, in conjunction with collaborative efforts which build upon and reinforce the overarching peace and security architecture of the continent, through a holistic understanding of what needs to be done to stamp out the root causes of these dangers across our continent.

Specifically, the New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), through some of its specific focuses on Regional Integration and Infrastructure, Human Development, and Economic and Corporate Governance, clearly articulates African frameworks for the coordinated development of the continent. NEPAD’s partner entity, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), whose ten-year anniversary we also commemorate in 2013, is precisely designed to assist African governments in both evaluating and improving their performance with regards to their political, economic, and corporate governance.

The AU has spearheaded a number of targeted policy frameworks that have been developed and ratified to combat the challenges of transnational organised crime across the continent, specifically focusing on human and illicit drug trafficking. Accordingly, in 2009, the AU Commission launched the AU Commission Initiative against Trafficking (AU COMMIT). Guided by the 2006 Ouagadougou Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, Especially Women and
Children, the AU COMMIT Initiative aims at consolidating the achievement of AU Commission activities and other global, regional and national initiatives. These efforts to empower African governments through the coordination and enhancement of their capacities to address such crosscutting challenges are imperative to addressing the illicit flows of organised crime.

Further, Africa’s RECs are also building off their comparative advantages, through regional integration, in order to combat organised criminal activities and uphold peace and security.

For example, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), with the support of UNODC, has successfully developed its Regional Action Plan To Address The Growing Problem Of Illicit Drug Trafficking, Organised Crimes And Drug Abuse In West Africa. Similarly, the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) Protocol on Gender and Development establishes six specific targets that aim to eliminate gender-based violence at all levels, of which human trafficking features prominently.

In addition, the countries of Africa are encouraged by increased multilateral engagements and agreements through UN mechanisms and platforms. A few weeks ago, the UN General Assembly ratified the Arms Trade Treaty, a historic agreement designed to regulate the number of conventional arms traded in an industry that has been recently valued at over $70 billion USD. This achievement should be celebrated as an important collaborative effort towards the reduction of armed conflict both on our Continent and throughout the world.

The overarching concern of organised crime is the ultimate threat it poses to the legitimacy, stability, and agency of the African state.

This argument is made in recognition that organised crime flourishes in environments defined by weak governance institutions, relatively porous borders, difficulties in establishing and maintaining central authority over peripheral regions, weak or absent institutional avenues for local actors to express their grievances through legitimate and non-violent means, and the influence of illicit economic activities, stemming from global forces of supply and demand.

Through direct or indirect means, organised crime undermines legitimate economic activity, has a potential to liquidate genuine state authority and social cohesion, incentivises corruption within governments and businesses, and institutionalises the use of violence as a medium of economic transaction. Organised crime thus undermines the legitimacy, stability, and agency of the African state.

Subsequently, if these conditions are not addressed through actions that both stem the prevalence of illicit activity and address the root causes of societal imbalances, organised criminal activity may result in the proliferation of extremist ideologies and violent non-state actors.

The recent experiences in Mali epitomise these dangers. The neglect of combating organised criminal activity both within its borders and throughout the broader
Sahel region, combined with failures to promote human security and development in the country, facilitated the rapid destabilisation of the Malian state.

Although the broader conditions of the conflict are rooted in the specific developments and histories of the Malian people and state, the immediate spark of the crisis we see today was directly caused by the NATO military intervention in Libya in the year 2011.

The 2012 UNSC Report of the assessment mission on the impact of the Libyan crisis on the Sahel region, exposes that the uncontrolled outflow of unaccounted arms and weapons from Libya have further emboldened organised criminal cells throughout the Sahel and within Mali. Specifically, this report raises alarm over the ways in which criminal entities such as terrorist cells and drug traffickers have procured Libyan weapons.

African leaders were well aware that military actions taken in Mali could destabilise the entire Sahel Region. The AU’s peacemaking initiative, which was roundly ignored by the P3 and the Arab League despite its affirmation in UNSC Resolution 1973, was intended to not only secure a negotiated settlement between then President Qaddafi and the Libyan rebels, but also specifically to contain the extensive network of transnational organised criminals and stockpiles of arms and weaponry under the control of the Libyan government.

Professor Alex de Waal has recently published an article in which he explores African roles in the Libyan conflict. He writes on the initial deliberations of the AU PSC:

At this very early stage, many African leaders privately recognized that the Arab Spring meant that Gaddafi could not remain in power. But, in the words of President Déby, they should also ‘beware of opening the Libyan Pandora’s box’. Libya’s Saharan neighbours were aware that if Gaddafi’s grip on the sundry transnational armed groups present in Libya were to be relaxed, at just the same time as the vast arsenals in his many military bases were opened, instability could rapidly spread across the region.

Consequently, the legitimacy, authority, and stability of the Malian state are now in jeopardy. Opportunistic and violent non-state actors, couched in ideologies of extremism and terrorism, openly combat African and French forces throughout Mali’s northern territories. Regardless of the speed and efficiency with which the present military intervention succeeds, it will be many years before the Malian state is able to create the fundamental conditions necessary to promote human security.

The late Chinua Achebe once remarked: “People say that if you find water rising up to your ankle, that’s the time to do something about it, not when it’s around your neck.”

We must find urgent solutions towards eliminating organised crime across our Continent. We must not only stop the leaks that flood our homes with water, but also strengthen our foundations so that these leaks do not recur.

We must uphold our responsibilities to not only stamp out all illicit organised crime but also to protect and promote the inalienable right to human security throughout the Continent.
The solutions we develop today must not only be African solutions to African problems, but also African solutions to global problems. We are in the midst of Africa’s renaissance, one driven by the flourishing of our human capital as well as the improvement of independent and strengthened political governance.

We must protect the people of Mother Africa, our Continent’s most valuable resource, by finding answers that not only protect them from the scourge of those who seek to do harm unto others, but by also empowering them to achieve their destinies as enlightened, prosperous, and free human beings.
Tribute to Meles Zenawi by H.E. Paul Kagame
President of the Republic of Rwanda

Bahir Dar, Ethiopia, 20th April 2013

Your Excellency Hailemariam Desalegn, Prime Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia;

Your Excellency Olusegun Obasanjo, Chairman of the Tana High Level Forum Advisory Board;

Excellencies Heads of State and Government;

Excellencies Former Heads of State

Distinguished Audience;

I am happy to be here with you and to have this privilege to be part of a discussion on the legacy of a late colleague, Pan-African, friend, and a source of inspiration for many - the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi.

I am also happy to be here this time around as I missed the inaugural meeting.

For me, even more so for Ethiopians and many other Africans, talking about Meles’ contribution goes beyond the boundaries of Ethiopia and encompasses the whole continent of Africa and beyond. He championed, not only Ethiopia’s, but Africa’s cause in various international forums with passion and conviction, and to great effect.

We recall, for instance, his commitment, together with other colleagues some of whom are here present with us, to the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). That dedication to Africa, among others, reflected his thinking on Africa’s development. NEPAD was, and still is, for many a collective vision for Africa’s renewal and progress. It is an expression of our common desire to construct a framework for development fully-owned and mainly driven by Africans.

We shall remember Meles Zenawi as a moderniser who dedicated his life to advancing the liberation and socio-economic transformation of his country and our continent. He was able to achieve a lot because he was a man of strong convictions. That strength derived from his ability to subject issues and situations to thorough study and analysis from which he was then able to chart a clear path to development based on domestic realities and home-grown solutions. On the strength of that analysis, he challenged and rejected conventional development models where they were not suitable.

Today, as during his life, Meles Zenawi is associated with the concept of a developmental democratic state which he articulated as the most appropriate vehicle for development at our current level of economic evolution.

For Meles and other like-minded African leaders, in a developing country where both social and finance capital are very low, the state must play an active role in
marshalling and directing development effort. It has to intervene in sourcing and directing investment to where it will have the greatest impact.

It is the only institution with the ability to build the physical and social infrastructure needed for the desired transformation of the country.

The state has the mandate and should empower its people, especially rural communities, to participate fully in the country’s political and economic activities. In so doing, solutions to national challenges are understood and owned by the people and become more effective and sustainable.

We have indeed experienced how this partnership with the people builds confidence for further achievements. This is the essence of people-centred, inclusive governance that Meles espoused and which many others in Africa would practice.

Equally, it is only the state that has the ability to mobilise international backing, both public and private, to support domestic choices and solutions to national challenges. Let me state, however, that this does not exclude working with others. It only means that the state has the primary responsibility and that cooperation is built on meaningful partnerships that recognise national choices.

Actual practice in a number of our countries has shown that it is an efficient state that is able to drive the development effort. Success for this requires continuous building of its institutions that can guarantee efficient performance, stability and continuity of policies.

Meles had the intellectual ability to formulate and argue the case for a developmental democratic state, historical proof of its success elsewhere in the world and the boldness to push it through.

And so, for instance, he was able to institute land reforms to rationalise land use, increase agricultural production, raise levels of food security and empower rural populations and transform their economy as we know it.

Similarly, education has been able to play a transformational role through expansion, both in terms of infrastructure and access.

Perhaps the most visible area of growth has been in infrastructure development. Dams have been built for generating electricity so crucial for industrialisation and improved living standards. Roads within the country as well as linking Ethiopia to neighbouring countries have been built and a thriving construction industry exists.

However, he did not conceive or even prescribe the concept of a developmental state as the model for all nations for he knew only too well that none fits all situations. Nor is there ever a consensus about any one answer to an issue like this. Solutions are contextual. That is why other Africans practice variations of the concept based on local conditions in their countries and may get equally good results.

It is evident to many of us that for a developing country, choices designed to accelerate development and growth are essentially politically driven and require the appropriate political set up for effec-
tive implementation. And that is to be provided by an actively and appropriately involved state.

This single-minded pursuit of a development agenda, as indeed Meles and others have done, has often led to a deliberate or ignorant misinterpretation of their intentions by some in the international community. And invariably, the question has been raised about whether the emphasis on development and the role of the state in it is not done at the expense of democracy and people’s rights.

For those who share Meles’ approach to development, there cannot be any contradiction between the two. They are actually mutually reinforcing - sustainable socio-economic development gives rise to greater democracy and political rights can best be exercised and enjoyed in a climate of growing prosperity and improved quality of life.

In any event, Meles believed, and other African leaders have a similar view, that democracy is built and grows and makes sense if it creates conditions for stability, continuity of policies, freedom, and the protection of gains that have already been made. Genuine democracy can never be equated to election cycles only as he emphasised. It has to do with the popular engagement of ordinary citizens in making and implementing choices that affect their lives - so true.

Successful governance systems are those that organically grow from local realities and reflect and respond to specific experiences. They do not have to be measured against arbitrary external standards, but can relate to them.

And in any case, those who disagree with or criticise our development and governance options do not provide any suitable or better alternatives. All they do is repeat abstract concepts like freedom and democracy as if doing that alone would improve the human condition. Yet for us, the evidence of results from our choices is the most significant thing.

I believe you have all seen how recent events in some parts of Africa have vindicated this view of democracy and development. We have witnessed the collapse of what had been touted as economic and democratic models on our continent, largely because they paid more attention to forms and symbols and ignored the substance. At the same time, we have seen the resilience of Ethiopia and other countries that have built their governance systems on the aspirations and participation of their people.

Excellencies;

In the quest for rapid socio-economic transformation, it often becomes necessary to take tough, even unpopular decisions that work and stick to them. Meles did and held to them despite strong opposition. And for doing what was right, being true to his vision, values and principles, he earned the wrath of some, but more significantly, the admiration of many.

And as so often happens in such circumstances, he was vilified and called all sorts of names. But he stayed the course and soon the results of his choices were too obvious to ignore. Ironically, it seems earning such names is a measure of the success of one’s policies.
Only a man of unusual courage, strong conviction, uncompromising integrity and selflessness could put the widespread criticism in its proper place and focus on meeting the needs of his people. It needed a person of remarkable powers of persuasion and the ability to articulate his position passionately, logically and clearly to convince his compatriots, other Africans and even others from further afield that his policies were correct.

Meles was such a man and was able to drive the transformation of Ethiopia and become the inspiration of many young Africans across the continent. Ethiopia today and during his life has attained a level of development and self-reliance not achieved before.

The subject of this forum was close to Meles’ heart and it is indeed fitting that a conference on security should be held in Ethiopia. He recognised from the outset that no country could prosper in peace and security when all around it was turmoil. The security of all was essential to the stability and prosperity of all. And because of this, Meles spared no effort to mediate where there was dispute or to intervene militarily when that was the only option.

Today, this region is increasingly more peaceful, permitting its people to lead better and more dignified lives. Across Africa, social and economic progress is going on at a level and pace we have not experienced before. Africa’s voice can no longer be ignored.

Rwandans in particular have a special bond with the late Meles Zenawi and the people of Ethiopia forged by shared values, ideals, solidarity and path to sustainable prosperity. We will always remember with gratitude his insistence for the formation of a Panel of Eminent Persons to investigate the genocide in Rwanda.

Excellencies;

Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen;

The vision of prosperity and unity the late Meles Zenawi had for his country and our continent, his dedication, commitment and personal sacrifice to its realisation and the policies he adopted to bring it about - all these are his legacy. The most fitting tribute we can pay him is to make Africa stronger, wealthier and an equal player on the world stage. And that we shall achieve if we are prepared to defend our right to make our own choices, deal with our own issues and stand up to all forms of injustice whatever their origin.

I thank you for your kind attention.
Annex V

Meles Zenawi: A Reflection
Remarks on the occasion of a conference at The Meles Foundation
The African Union
6 April 2013

To help locate Meles Zenawi’s words and deeds, I will briskly address two companion ideals that he deemed of central importance to Ethiopia and the rest of Africa: embracing diversity; and his ardent advocacy of a democratic developmental state. Meles’s perspective on these matters was guided by what might be called the ideal of the statesman. The ideal of the statesman is aptly captured by John Rawls, the leading political philosopher of our time, who writes: “The ideal of the statesman is suggested by the saying: the politician looks to the next election, the statesman to the next generation. It is the task of the statesman to discern [the permanent conditions and the real interests of a well-ordered society] in practice. The statesman sees deeper and further than most others and grasps what needs to be done. The statesman must get it right, or nearly so, and then hold fast from this vantage. Statesmen may have their own interests when they hold office, yet they must be selfless in their judgments and assessments of their society’s fundamental interests and must not be swayed.” (The Law of Peoples, p.92) Thus, what may strike us as vices - - say, high mindedness and high handedness - in a politician may well be among the defining virtues of the statesman.

In order to appreciate Meles’s contribution to our effort to come to terms with our cultural diversity, we can roughly distinguish three aspects of diversity and its public significance: one having to do with the past; another concerning the present or existing value; and a third pertaining to the future. First, affirming diversity sometimes matters in our attempt to overcome past injustices, particularly injustices that were sources of bitter nationalist and class conflict, posing a threat to the very survival of a political community. Meles Zenawi and the organization to which he belonged and led fought singularly and singlemindedly against an entrenched system of coercive assimilation, forcible exclusion and exploitation of millions of Ethiopians who belonged to faiths and cultural communities different from the privileged public culture. Championing the equality and freedom of Ethiopia’s diverse faiths and cultures marks a revolution in the country’s modern history. As Christopher Clapham rightly remarks: “The overthrow of the military in 1991 amounted to more than the collapse of a particular regime. It effectively marked the failure of a project, dating back to Menelik’s accession in 1889, of creating a modern and centralized state around a Showan core.” (P.Woodward and M.Forsyth, Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa, p.37.) Beyond rectifying grave past injustices, sealing the fate of
the project was a matter of great practical urgency. Victorious popular movements that mobilized and organized against military tyranny with a firm sense of national identity were not prepared to entrust their fate to a political arrangement that did not fully recognize the equality and freedom of their respective communities. In the absence of an entitlement to enter and to exit the political community freely, many were prepared to go their own way. To honor the entitlement, in turn, necessitated the provision of self-rule for each cultural community and fair representation in the governance of the shared political community. Recognizing the values, beliefs and histories of those engaged in the making of the new Ethiopia suggests that federal arrangements were inescapable for the survival and viability of an Ethiopian political community. To cite Rawls again: “It is the task of the statesman to struggle against the potential lack of affinity among different peoples and try to heal its causes insofar as they derive from past domestic institutional injustice, and from the hostility among social classes inherited through their common history and antagonisms.” (p.112) My claim is that both in the victorious struggle mounted against military tyranny and in the making of Ethiopia’s bold new constitution, Meles Zenawi has admirably discharged this task of statesmanship.

Although upholding diversity constitutionally may do away with structural injustices stemming from coercive suppression and exploitation of cultural communities, injustice owing to an ethos of cultural inequality may persist. For instance, racism notoriously outlives the abolition of legal and institutional systems of racial discrimination. In order to overcome the ethos of cultural inequality and to cultivate close affinity among Ethiopia’s diverse cultural communities, the constitution provides the basis for cooperation in an inclusive community, cooperation that yields mutual benefits to all, and gives precedence to the interests of those historically most disadvantaged. In consequence, we owe to Meles Zenawi a sense of solidarity among the peoples of Ethiopia, which is supplanting the attitudes of resentment and hostility that were pervasive features of our dark past.

Diversity, secondly, matters on account of what the late Jerry Cohen characterized as a defense of existing value. (G.A.Cohen, Finding Oneself in the Other, pp143-174.) If people genuinely value their particular cultures and their distinctive national or cultural identities, it is not enough to settle for the realist idea that it would be difficult to undo the collective selfconception of a cultural community once that is an existing and entrenched fact. Rather, the point is that the value of what exists deserves to be respected and preserved even if more overall value could be attained through its control or sacrifice. Jerry Cohen also notes that respect toward already existing value is hospitable to diversity “because much variety reflects accident.” This case for diversity does not imply that cultures and cultural identities are, or should be, somehow fixed. Cultures and cultural identities as well as their constitutive values may well change; indeed, it may even be, as some have argued, that change is necessary for cultur-
al survival. I believe it was evident that Meles Zenawi took palpable pride in an inclusive Ethiopian political community, where Ethiopia’s diverse cultural communities and identities enjoyed public presence and value. It is a testament to his evident delight in Ethiopia’s diversity that upon his untimely death virtually every cultural community claimed him as one of its own.

Finally, the public recognition of diversity and its empowerment may be essential to realize public values and practices such as democracy, material betterment and equality in unfavorable or non-ideal circumstances, which John Rawls characterizes as “conditions of societies whose historical, social and economic circumstances make their achieving a well-ordered regime, whether liberal or decent, difficult or impossible.” (p.5) It is important to see if a public culture and institutions upholding diversity help to mitigate unfavorable conditions - - say, poverty, limited reach of education, deep cultural cleavages, a history of sharp class divisions, the absence of an abiding culture of peace and tolerance, an immature tradition of open and robust public discussion and deliberation, a dearth of political organizations, organized interest groups, and vibrant free associations - - for the effective pursuit of the ideals of democracy and social justice.

Just how does diversity and its institutional expression in federalism serve wider aspirations for democracy and social justice? In a setting where competitive politics, an independent judiciary, a zealous press are still in their infancy, the devolution of power to regions with robust rights of self-rule serves as a significant check on the abuse of state power. These same unfavorable circumstances together with dire poverty inhibit the effective practice of representative government. Still, the expressive, associational and deliberative rights of a democracy can be effectively exercised in the public spaces opened by regional self-rule. Ordinary citizens using their own languages and electing their own authorities can participate in the public life of their own community. They can make choices and decisions on the provision of important public services: the courts, schools, health care and development schemes. With a commitment to share a political community and an economy, they can pool their resources in a spirit of solidarity to fight poverty in ways that accord priority to the least advantaged communities and citizens. With the success of the collective fight against poverty and for equality, the sense of a shared fate and the spirit of solidarity would be strengthened over time.

Marked advances in material betterment would encourage other forms of diversity to flourish. With the growth of urban populations, greater access to quality education, a vigorous free press and public fora, moral pluralism as well as diversity in conceptions of the common good would emerge. The result would be values and associations that cross the bounds of cultural diversity. Thus as cultural diversity and its institutional arrangements succeed in helping us to overcome unfavorable conditions for a free public life, cultural diversity may itself be the agent for the diminishment of its own importance. Put differently, cultural diversity may prove to be a self
effacing public ideal. The principled pursuit of self-effacing public ideals itself attests to visionary statesmanship.

Let me now turn briefly to another companion self-effacing public ideal championed by Meles Zenawi and, once again, compelled by highly unfavorable conditions for free institutions and social justice: the democratic developmental state. Again John Rawls says: "[societies burdened by unfavorable conditions] . . . lack the political and cultural traditions, the human capital and know-how, and, often the material and technological resources needed to be well-ordered." (p106) The gravity of these and similar burdens in Ethiopia carried great weight in Meles Zenawi’s thought and action. He was convinced that enduring peace or the very possibility of a viable political community was unthinkable without swift development and a clean break with hunger and chronic poverty. In the absence of development, democracy cannot be more than a selection of ruling elites through competitive elections, where national resources would be regularly deployed for patronage by the rivals. And the liberties possibly protected under such a democracy cannot be meaningfully exercised by the many languishing in poverty and living in the shadow of hunger.

Meles resolutely rejected the prevalent prescription that the fragile, predatory African state should beat a retreat from the economy in favor of the ascendancy of the market. He argued that in a poor agricultural economy such as ours the market is a woefully inadequate instrument for the creation of a dynamic capitalist economy. In an economy with few areas of clear comparative advantage, economic agents would be drawn to activities that secure returns without adding value. The state would have to play an active role to steer economic agents toward activities that enhance productivity and value. The state would also be a major player in sectors such as banking, telecommunication and energy, which are susceptible to monopolistic or speculative practices. In addition, the state must be the major agent of public goods and services such as modern roads, education, health care, telecommunication, energy in ways that reliably extend their reach to a large rural population. Moreover, major engines of growth and value creation—say, technological innovation—are not easy to discover or to disseminate if left to the vicissitudes of the market. Above all, a strong, active state is essential to muster the political will, consensus and continuity indispensable for a long-term, transformative developmental strategy. With this, there would be the possibility of an internalized ethic of growth and transformation shared by public officials and the bulk of the population to turn the aspiration of development into an ongoing national undertaking. The state together with an economically and politically mobilized and organized peasantry with access to education, information and technology would transform the agrarian sector. A sizeable rise in agricultural output can, over time, support industrialization. Such growth would defeat dire poverty and raise the lives of the bulk of the population to meaningful opportunities for worthwhile lives and genuine choices for the effective exercise of rights and freedoms.
With the advent of a capitalist economy, a dominant party or a dominant coalition of parties and its ideal of a democratic developmental state can give way to other organizations and ideals in a society unburdened from the unfavorable conditions that originally necessitated them.

There would now be a robust social base for liberal and social democratic politics without the danger of lapsing into anarchy or chaos, and thereby courting the attendant catastrophic risk of condemning the multitude to perpetual poverty. Hence, in a democratic developmental state we may have found a democratic way of overcoming unusually unfavorable conditions for democracy and social justice.

Keeping faith with self-effacing ideals and the politics of transition compelled by unfavorable material and social conditions is never easy. It takes a clear and undistracted focus on distant, worthy goals and a dedicated quest for ethically acceptable paths for reaching them. With the sudden loss of Meles Zenawi’s statesmanship, we have no choice but to carry on his legacy with hope born of the continual, marked advance in the freedom and well-being of the citizenry.

Andreas Esheté
Statement by His Excellency, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud
President of the Federal Government of Somalia

First and foremost, let me take this opportunity to wholeheartedly congratulate the TANA HIGH LEVEL FORUM BOARD for successfully convening the 2nd TANA High level forum on security in Africa. Special appreciation and gratitude goes to two of the most respected Africa’s statesman and members of the Tana Forum Board His Excellency Olusegun Obasanjo and His Excellency Thabo Mbeki. I wish them very best and success.

We are much obliged to our hosts, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, to upkeep international attention and focus to the plight of security and organized crimes in Africa. We all thank our host and those who initiated and organized this forum and the patience, compassion and hospitality to us.

Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,

Terrorism is one of the biggest and most challenging security threats facing Africa and the World in the twenty-first century. To meet this challenge, a truly African approach is needed, based on a clear legal foundation and solid cooperation. The Federal Government of Somalia in rejoining to the African spectrum as well as in the community of nations would like to contribute significantly and constructively in developing new ideas and frameworks to combat and improve security, based on our own experiences.

As stated by those who already spoke, I am delighted to pay my tribute and great admiration to the champion and the biggest advocate to peace and stability in Africa in general and in this region in particular, the late Prime Minister of Ethiopia, H.E. Meles Zenewi.

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Today, Africa needs strong commitment from its leaders and people to stand together to combat any sort of illegal activities, including the drugs and human trafficking, illegal arms trade, illegal fishing and maritime piracy, toxic waste dumping, money laundering and any other organized crime in Africa.

I use the word stand together because, current organized crimes are Africanized; Therefore, the effort to combat it MUST also be Africanized. I believe that our concerted efforts mitigated with a strong legal framework; and enforced laws will generate a better image for Africa.
Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Africa must have the courage to say Crime is a Crime whatever elements it involves, it has no justification, and we have to combat it once and for all both intellectually and militarily in a unified manner.

Let me clarify about the present situation of my country. The challenges that Somalia faces today are complex and differ from the traditional organized crimes. Lack of security and functioning law enforcement apparatus multiplied by prolonged statelessness have created a wide spread instability in the country. As a result, establishing effective security sector remained top priority for my Government. Today, however, there are encouraging signs of progress and hope, and looking forward to stable country with functioning security, justice and law enforcement institutions.

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Unlike some other countries, Somalia experiences daily instances of criminality, to the vulnerable people, and abiding citizens losing their confidences and trust to the institutions. The challenge we are phasing is simultaneously building effective security institutions in one hand and fighting organized crimes on the other hand, we have no choice. WE MUST DO IT ON ALL ACCOUNTS.

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am a firm believer that our national security depends on having safe and secure neighbors, so our neighbors will depend on a safe and secure somalia.

The challenges that Somalia is facing today can be won and overcome, if our African brothers and the international communities together assist Somalia in building our security forces and its related institutions with all its effectiveness and oversight civilian leadership.

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let me remind you, that the threats of transnational organized criminal activities in Somalia are not limited to piracy and terrorism. It extends illegal fishing, toxic waste dumping and a huge destruction of our forest charcoal production and export. These activities will not only be illegal but causing for Somalia huge environmental problems that pauses serious danger for generations to come.

These crimes have to stop. This must not be seen as a Somali problem. It is both African and global and must be faced in that way.

Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,

We know that the costs imposed by Somali piracy on the global economy are so high and that international mobilization to eradicate piracy is ongoing effort. However, these efforts cannot be sustained without stable somalia. Parallel to that, my Government has launched a huge campaign to eradicate the piracy through mediation and dialogue with the community leaders and the local stakeholders. The fruits of this campaign have led to the voluntary denunciation of so many young Somalis to these illegal activities. The Government is planning to present to the international community a plan for reengaging the young former pirates by establishing a vocational
training centers and reeducating to abide by the national and international laws.

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I believe that Africa is waiting us to fully address and discuss these issues in very frank and concerted way. To combat all sorts of transnational organized crimes, we need to work out a strategy from the local to the global level. The need for effective communications to fight national and international organized crimes must be made locally and globally. I hereby confirm that Somalia is committed to this.

Above all, we need a forum like this august one to organize many events to continuously address and focus on the eradication of these crimes.

May I take this opportunity to express my deep appreciation and gratitude to the Institute of Peace and Security Studies, the TANA High Level Forum Board for giving me the chance to address this forum. I would also like to express the same appreciation of this audience. I am particularly indebted to Prime Minister HailemariamDesalegn who offered me to participate for the first time in this Forum.

Excellencies, let me conclude by thanking the Federal Government of Ethiopia for being the host for this forward-looking event. Somalia owes you for this endeavor.

You are a true friend!

THANK YOU.
Annex VII

Speech by H.E. Omar al-Bashir
President of the Republic of Sudan

In the name of Allah the merciful and almighty.
H.E. Hailemariam Desalegn
H.E. and good friend President Obasanjo, Chairman of the Tana High Level Forum Advisory Board
Prof. Andreas Eshete, CEO of the Tana High Level Forum
Prof. Ndioro Ndiaye Chair of this session
Excellencies,
Ladies and gentlemen
Assalam Aleikum!

Let me at the outset express my gratitude and thanks to the Ethiopian Government for their kind invitation to participate in this important forum and for the usual warm hospitality in this beautiful city of Bahr Dar. We also value the efforts exerted by the Institute for Peace and Security Studies of the Addis Ababa University and the other organizers for the excellent preparation and arrangements for this forum.

I would like to add my voice to those who spoke before me in commenting the concept paper presented by President Mbeki; a paper which contained rich information, authentic statistics, deep analysis and useful suggestions that deserve to be considered and implemented. We must first recognize the effects of organized crime on security and governance, and secondly attempt to consolidate effective African coordination bilateral, regional and international levels to minimize and weaken the effects of organized crime and ultimately de-rooting it.

With this intervention I hope to contribute in enriching the discussion conducted by some of the eminent personalities and leaders who have vast experiences on the issue at stake. Naturally I will base my contribution on the Sudanese experience. I am confident that you are aware of the effect of organized crime on Sudan, a country with a massive and vast area which makes it extremely difficult to control its long and extended borders with its neighbors. A country that has suffered for years from armed conflicts, whether internally before the secession of the South, or with the neighboring countries, we learned from these bitter experiences.

We learned from these experiences that there is a nexus between the internal armed conflicts and organized crime, this nexus is like a vicious and evil circle composed of many factors all of which are fueling the inferno of crisis. The blatant example here is the way in which the Darfur issue has evolved. As we know, Darfur erupted as a result of the competition on scarce resources but aggravated by proliferation of arms and weapons in the area as a direct result of instability in...
the neighboring countries and exploitation by arms dealers and looters seeking poisonous profits from an already fragile situation.

We in Sudan are giving maximum priority to cementing a partnership between the state and the community groups in combatting organized crime. We have some wonderful and fruitful examples of complementarity between the law enforcement organs and the popular bodies represented by community police.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, its matrix Abuja Accords, and the Doha Agreement for Peace in Darfur, all demonstrate our political will to realize peace through dialogue in order to create a conducive atmosphere that contributes effectively to combatting organized crime and form a strong partnership with the citizens, the real stakeholders, to achieve security and stability. We also engaged in tremendous efforts with the neighboring states to control the border zones and transforming them on one hand to areas of mutual interest for trade and hubs for combatting organized transnational crimes on the other hand. As you may know, Sudan has success stories in this regard by forming joint monitoring forces with Chad, Central African Republic and similar ongoing efforts with Egypt. We also took the initiative to work with our brothers in Libya, after the victory in their revolution, to launch the idea of regional cooperation to restore and maintain peace in border areas, and I am glad to report that a regional meeting was convened in 2012 to this effect.

It was evident that the distortion that characterized the Afro-Libyan relations, resulted from the evil policies of the Gheddafi regime which made it a point to ignite regional and international conflicts and arming rebels in many countries, Sudan included. It is no secret the region, especially in Mali, continues to suffer from the aftershocks of the defunct regime in Libya and the proliferation of armed groups after the collapse of the Gheddafi regime. We are optimistic that the winds of change are blowing towards the realization of peace, unity and territorial integration in the countries of Sahel belt which will lead to stronger cooperation which will hopefully serve to stop the present organized crime, drug smuggling, human trafficking and illegal immigration.

We are of the opinion that poverty and unemployment are the root causes of committing crime and the reason why young people take risks in their attempts to migrate. We also believe that the right to development and the right to employment should be given priority along with other rights. The unfair sanctions and the extended debt prove to be tools to deepen the misery of the people rather than a punishment against governments. The policies designed to control the international community and the coercive measures adopted by the United States against drug trafficking in Latin America and also by Europe against illegal immigration from Africa, all proved to be ineffective. Not only that, but the drug cartels in South America and their agents sought out safe havens in Sub-Saharan African countries to use them as corridors for drug trade, using money to corrupt government institutions and further aggravate the internal armed
conflict and becoming a source for financing extremist and terrorist organizations in the area, thus activating money laundering operations. We believe that drug trafficking should be combated by raising awareness among young people and giving them employment opportunities in order to avoid the risk of being entrapped by drug addiction.

Sudan is suffering from illegal immigration especially in its eastern part. The phenomenon of human trafficking is one of the products of this situation which is taking place in remote areas in the eastern part of the country. To combat this, Sudan has put in place administrative, financial and legal measures to monitor, pre-empt and eradicate money laundering. Sudan has signed and ratified many international conventions to this effect. I would like to mention that Khartoum, this month, will host the 17th session of MENETIF, a regional body in charge of combatting money laundering and we look forward to the meeting which will further strengthen the regional and international cooperation in this field.

We think that the remedy to these issues should be based on a holistic approach, by addressing the root causes of organized crime, launching development projects, creating jobs and widening the scope of education and vocational training on one hand, and boosting the regional cooperation in border areas and capacity building measures for law enforcement and justice institutions personnel and information exchange on the other hand.

Finally I would like to thank my friend President Mbeki for his accurate characterization of our problems and for his advocacy for African solutions for African problems. In fact our problems can be solved if we manage to neutralize the external factors which usually play a negative role in the issues. We in Sudan are working as you mentioned promulgating a new constitution and it is an attempt to solve all these problems based on the wise words you mentioned Mr. President.

You have my thanks and respect

Assalam aleikum wa rahmat Allah
Annex VIII

Host City: Bahir Dar

Bahir Dar is one of the leading tourist attractions in Ethiopia, situated along the shores of Lake Tana, Ethiopia’s largest lake and the source of the Blue Nile. Other than the breath-taking view of Lake Tana, the city gets its beauty from the avenues lined with palm trees and a variety of colourful flowers.

Bahir Dar is a rich part of Ethiopian history. This history has been well captured by the distinguished Ethiopian historian, Professor Richard Pankhurst. The following essay offers a brief historical background on the venue of the Tana Forum.

Ethiopia and the Nile
Threats, Discoveries and Disputes
The Nile, a mighty river, whose waters flowed from Ethiopia to Egypt, irrevela-
bly linked the two countries and civilisations throughout the ages.

**Inter-Dependency**
This relationship between the two countries, by the dawn of the Christian era, involved a major element of inter-dependency. Egypt was dependent on the Ethiopian interior that provided the Egyptian River Nile with the bulk of its water. Ethiopia for her part was dependent on Egypt for her *Abun*, the Head of her Church, who was for centuries recruited from among the Christian monks of Egypt.

Mutual dependency of this kind, on one side material (the water, known in Ethiopia as the Abbay) and on the other spiritual (the *Abun*), might at first sight seem beneficial in providing a workable formula for co-existence. This in the long run, however, was not always the case because the supposed mutual relationship was not inherently stable. The water flowing down the Nile to Egypt varied significantly from year to year. The coming of the *Abun* to Ethiopia was likewise far from regular - for it depended on all sorts of political and other circumstances.

**Variations in Nile Flow**
The earliest recorded difficulties with the Nile would seem to be reported in the Ethiopian *Synaxarium*. It states that, because of the “wickedness” of the Ethiopian people during the time of the Coptic Patriarchs Joseph (831-849) and Gabriel (1131-1149) God “restrained the Heavens” so that “it would not rain”.

An even more serious problem arose in 1089-1090 when, according to the Arab historian al-Makin, the Nile waters failed to reach Egypt. The then Egyptian ruler Sultan Mustanir accordingly despatched an embassy to the king of Ethiopia (whose name is not recorded) asking him to restore the flood of water, which he reportedly did.

**Ethiopian Control over the Nile?**
This incident appears to have been significant in giving rise to the long-held myth that the Ethiopians could somehow or other control the flow of Nile water reaching Egypt. This belief, though unsubstantiated, was naturally convenient to the rulers of Ethiopia in their negotiations with the Egyptians, who would otherwise have been much the stronger party.

Power over the Nile was accordingly voiced by a succession of no fewer than seven medieval Ethiopian monarchs: Lalibela (1185-1225?) Na’akuto La’ab (1203-1250?), ‘Amda Seyon I (1312-1342), Sayfa Ar’ad, Dawit I (1380-1409), Zar’a Yaqob (1433-1468) and Lebna Dengel (1508-1540).

Scrutiny of their history shows, however, that not one of the above rulers ever took any action to deviate the flow of the Nile, or indeed had the ability to do so. Ethiopian threats were in effect no more than negotiating gambits, i.e. empty threats.

This view is supported by the archaeological record which suggests that no excavations in the vicinity of the Nile or of any of its major tributaries, as would be required to deviate the flow of these rivers, was ever undertaken. However, the Egyptians, living far down the Nile, and for the Ethiopians in their highland fastnesses, the threat seemed real enough.
The Crusaders and the Diffusion of an Idea
Report of the Ethiopian ability to control the Nile duly reached the European Crusaders - Italians, Frenchmen, Englishmen and others. From them it spread to other “experts” on the East, where it was adopted, into Accepted Wisdom. The Italian poet Ariosto thus has the hero of his epic Orlando Furioso, of 1516, declare that Prester John, i.e. ruler of Ethiopia, had the power to cut off the waters of the Nile and thereby reduce the inhabitants of Cairo and its vicinity to famine. Such ideas, by then perhaps a quarter of a millennium old, were soon to be challenged, and overthrown, by the advance of “discovery”, i.e. geographical investigation.

“Discovery” of the Source of the Nile
Any discussion of “discovering” the Source of the Nile, or any other geographical feature, should be qualified by the understanding that what is reported to have been “discovered” by foreign “explorers” was in all probably known to the local inhabitants since time immemorial.

The honour of “discovering”, i.e. first describing, the Source of the Abbay, belongs to the early 17th century Portuguese and Spanish Jesuit travellers to Ethiopia, and, more specifically to the Spaniard Jerónimo Lobo, who visited the country in 1618.

Lobo’s report on his Ethiopian travels, including his visit to the Source of the Nile, is couched in a matter-of-fact manner, but conforms so fully to later descriptions of the area that it can only be accepted as genuine.

Its veracity was, however, later challenged by the Scottish traveller James Bruce, who dismissed Lobo as “the greatest liar of the Jesuits”. He did so, we can only assume, because he wanted to be acclaimed the first “discoverer” of the Source.

The Source
Before looking in detail at Lobo’s description of the Source (or in fact two sources) of the river we should recall that, both are situated on marshy land, south-west of Lake Tana. From these the water trickles into the Small Abbay, a little river that runs into Lake Tana from the west. Fed during the rainy season by water carrying with it much silt it is then very muddy and can be identified for a considerable distance as it flows south-eastwards across the lake towards the town of Bahr Dar. Not far from it the river emerges from the lake as the Large Abbay, having lost much of its earlier silt, and makes its way to the Sudan, Egypt and beyond.

There are indications that the Small Abbay area was venerated in the past, not so much as the Source of the mighty Nile, as Bruce may have thought, but rather on account of the nearby presence of the lake and the river – both of which were in the popular mind endowed with holy significance.

Lobo’s Account
Lobo’s account, to which we must now turn, though brief gives a seemingly accurate picture which could have been based only on personal observation. He describes “two circular pools or wells of water”, which, he says, could more appropriately be called “pits”. Four spans
in width and separated from each other by a distance of a stone’s throw, they differed significantly in depth.

Lobo goes on to observe that the whole nearby plain, and especially the part near the sources, seemed “a subterranean lake” because the ground was “so swollen and undermined with water that it appears to bubble up when a person walks on it, which is seen more clearly when there are large rainfalls for then the ground yields and goes down at any step one takes on it, and the reason it does not swallow up anyone who walks on it is that, since all the land is green and this part had many various grasses and herbs, the roots are so intertwined that, with the little soil that holds them together, they can support anyone who walks on the field, which at its widest point can be crossed by a stone’s throw, but only if shot by a sling”.

The second source, which he says, lay to the east of the first, was “so deep that with a measure of more than twenty spans the bottom could not be found”.

Jesuits such as Lobo, with his first hand knowledge of the Sources, played an important part in Nile history, for they
rejected the age-old belief that the rulers of Ethiopia could control the flow of Nile water. One of the most prominent of their number, Baltazar Tellez, emphatically dismissed any such suggestion, declaring that the river, with its immense mass of water could not be re-directed over the vast area suggested, as so much of it was occupied by steep and rugged mountains.

James Bruce, Luigi Balugani, and Empress Mentuwab
James Bruce undertook his famous and self-publicised travels to the Lake Tana area, as he claims, ‘to discover the Source of the Nile’, and presents this as the great achievement of his life. To enhance his reputation he was apparently not above “doctoring” the historical record: ignoring or caricaturing the earlier travels of the Jesuits; and falsifying the date of his Italian draftsman Luigi Balugani’s death (and totally omitting any reference to him in his published work) to make it appear that he, James Bruce, had been alone in reaching the Source of the Nile.

Bruce’s single-minded interest in the
Source of the Nile struck the powerful Empress Mentuwab, and drew from her the following memorable comment:

“You have come from Jerusalem, through hot unwholesome climates, to see a river and a bog, no part of which you can carry away, were it ever so valuable and you take it ill when I discourage you from the pursuit of this fancy, in which you are likely to perish without your friends at home ever hearing when or where the accident happened. While I, the mother of Kings, who have sat on the Throne of this country more than thirty years, have for my only wish, night and day, that after giving up everything in the world I could be conveyed to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem and beg alms for my subsistence all my life after, if only I could be buried in the street within sight of that temple where Our Blessed Saviour once lay”.

And all the while the question of possible Ethiopian control over the Nile was not finally resolved.

The Uncertainties of Hiob Ludolf
The verdict of Tellez and the Jesuits notwithstanding, one voice was raised in possible support of the old Control of the Nile idea. This was that of Hiob Ludolf, the founder of Ethiopian studies in Germany. Clearly hoping that some means of obtaining such control might be found, he closely questioned his Ethiopian friend and informant, Abba Gorgoreyos, about such a possibility. When the good Ethiopian scholar replied in the negative, dashing such hopes, Ludolf commented that if the Ethiopians had possessed such powers they would surely have used them to obtain from the Turks and Egyptians better facilities for their trade through the Red Sea coast.

The European Scramble for Africa
The politics of the Blue Nile, like those of the continent as a whole, were transformed by the European Scramble for Africa. It began, in this part of the continent at least, with the allegedly “temporary” British occupation of Egypt, which started in 1882 – and was to endure for many more decades than the term “temporary” would have led contemporaries to expect.

The Scramble, which was facilitated by such innovations as the steam-engine, the gun-boat, and the Maxim Gun, was governed by the General Act of Berlin, signed by the Colonial Powers on 26 February 1885. Though primarily concerned with Africa there was not a single African signatory to this Act.

While the General Act was concerned with the continent as a whole, the situation in various areas was determined by more specific regional agreements, likewise concluded between the Colonial Powers, with little or no African participation.

As far as the Blue Nile was concerned the Ethiopian ruler Emperor Menelik, who had only six years earlier overcome an Italian attempt to establish a Protectorate over his country by force, felt it necessary to establish amicable relations with the British. They were pressing him to conclude, on 15 May 1902, what was clearly an “Unequal Treaty” – a term used for treaties imposed by the European Powers in China, for example. Article 3 stated that he engaged “not to
construct or allow to be constructed any work across the Blue Nile, Lake Tana, or the Sobat [river] which would arrest the flow of their waters into the Nile, except in agreement with the governments of Great Britain and the Sudan”, i.e. the governments of Egypt and Sudan both under British occupation.

Menelik could perhaps afford to agree to this Unequal Treaty because Ethiopia, at that stage of her economic development, had no immediate need for dams or other works on the Blue Nile, Lake Tana or Sobat. It was obvious, however, that as the country developed it would in all probability require more Nile water for irrigation, hydroelectric power etc. – hence the restriction imposed upon it by the 1902 treaty. That treaty was detrimental to Ethiopian interests as it imposed a restriction on the country’s development – a restriction which would become increasingly serious as her economic progress advanced.

A Changing World
The founding of the United Nations and of the African Union, the dawn of the Arab Spring, and other developments of the present, such as Ethiopia’s recent achievement of swift economic growth. It is now increasingly agreed that the Nile region should be ruled by its own people, rather than by foreign leaders in far-off capitals. The waters of the Nile must henceforward belong, without any restriction, to all the African inhabitants of the countries where this water originates or through which it flows.

Management of the Nile must henceforth provide a basis of scientific cooperation and friendship; no longer of rivalry, enmity and mistrust.

Tourist information
The capital city of the State of Amhara is Bahir-Dar. The State of Amhara consists of 10 administrative zones, one special zone, 129 woredas, and 38 urban centres. Amharic is the working language of the state. The State of Amhara covers an estimated area of 161,828 square kilometres.

Location
The State of Amhara is located in the north-western and north-central part of Ethiopia. The State shares common borders with the state of Tigray in the north, Afar in the east, Oromiya in the south, Benishangul/Gumuz in the south west, and the Republic of Sudan in the west.

Major Economic Activities
About 85% of the people are engaged in agriculture. The State is one of the major Teff (staple food) producing areas in the country. Barley, wheat, oil seeds, sorghum, maize, wheat, oats, beans and peas are major crops produced in large quantities.

Cash crops such as cotton, sesame, sunflower, and sugarcane grow in the vast and virgin tract of the region’s lowlands. The water resources from Lake Tana and all the rivers found in the region provide immense potential for irrigation development.

About 450,000 hectares of arable land is irrigable and suitable, especially for horticultural development.

Rivers and Lakes
Tana, the largest lake in Ethiopia, is located at centre of the region. It covers an area of 36,000 km². The rivers and lakes
of the region have immense potential for hydroelectric power generation, irrigation and fishery development.

**Minerals**
The State of Amhara has mineral resources such as coal, shell, limestone, lignite, gypsum, gemstone, silica, sulfur and bentonite. Hot springs and mineral water are also found in the region.

**Tourism and Heritage**
The 12th Century rock-hewn churches of Lalibela and the palaces in Gondar are world-known heritages in Ethiopia. The traditional mural paintings and handcraft, the preserved corpse of the royalty found in the ancient monasteries in Lake Tana, as well as the Semien mountains national park, which shelters the endemic Walia ibex are spectacular tourist attractions. Three tourist attractions found in the region are registered in the UNESCO list of world heritages. Besides these known heritages, the Blue Nile Falls, the caves and unique stones in northern Showa, and the Merto Le Mariam church are special tourist attractions.

### Important Tips

**Altitude**
The altitude of Addis Ababa is 2500 meters (8000 feet) and may affect some visitors. You may feel a little tired or sleepless for the first 24 hours. Therefore, do not over exert yourselves by doing tiring exercises. The altitude of Bahir Dar, at 1800 meters (5900 feet), is considerably lower.

**Currency**
The “Birr” is the Ethiopian currency. 1 USD is equal to about 17.34 Birr. As the Birr is floating, check before you change your currency but all banks have the same rate. ATM machines are available and international bank cards such as Visa and MasterCard are accepted.

**Weather**
The month of April is usually sunny but there can be occasional rain. The average day temperature will be around 22 degrees Celsius (71 degrees Fahrenheit) and will be considerably less in the evenings and mornings. Bring a warm jacket for the evenings.